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“CONFRONTING” FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: CRAWFORD ROADBLOCKS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM TRIALS

John Scott*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the first decade of this century, a central preoccupation of American foreign policy has been the rise of international terrorism.1 This phenomenon provokes questions about the interrelation of international and domestic criminal law, constitutional interpretation, intelligence gathering, and military strategy. Now, after the challenges of the last eight years, the rhetoric (if not yet the reality) of American policy on terrorism seems to be changing.2 The attempt to transfer prosecution from military tribunals to Article III courts is exemplary of this overall shift. But there are deeper legal issues at play beyond the political repercussions of this shift.3 A recent line of cases from the Supreme Court has the potential to make the process of trying suspected terrorists more complicated than it need be.4 Crawford v. Washington and its progeny have articulated a new standard for Confrontation Clause analysis and in so doing have raised significant questions about the future admissibility of certain evidence in criminal trials.5

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The goal of this Comment is to analyze the new confrontation rule from *Crawford* to determine what types of challenges its more rigorous testimonial evidence standard poses for prosecutors in future terrorism cases. Subpart II.A will provide background on the relevant cases, discussing the Court’s holding in *Crawford* as well as its subsequent clarification in *Davis v. Washington*. Subpart II.B will describe the two primary federal regulations governing specific rules applicable to the use of foreign intelligence at trial. Part III will argue that the new Confrontation Clause standard potentially conflicts with these federal regulations and analyze the costs this conflict could impose on the government. Lastly, Part IV will attempt to weigh the merits of potential solutions and assess the likelihood of their adoption.

II. BACKGROUND

A. CRAWFORD: CHANGING THE RULES

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” The common law developed a general antipathy towards the introduction of hearsay evidence and it is thought the Confrontation Clause embodies the same general principle. The common law also disfavors reliance upon ex parte testimony presented through affidavits. Defendants have the right to compel witnesses against

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6 The goal of this Comment is not to promote the introduction of unreliable hearsay evidence against foreign defendants at trial. Rather, both the new *Crawford* rule and the new FISA warrant standard are problematic and should be reassessed because they impose significant costs on prosecution and these costs may discourage the Government from bringing charges in criminal courts against suspected terrorists. The assumption is that prosecutions of foreign terrorists are going to continue in one forum or another (be it military, criminal, or “other”). This Comment starts from the presumption that Article III courts are preferable, and for this reason the legal community should be cognizant of instances where (perhaps unintended) intersections of rules potentially throw up road blocks to the introduction of otherwise reliable evidence.

7 U.S. Const. amend. VI.


9 The holdings in both *Crawford* and *Davis* rely heavily upon examples of sixteenth- and seventeenth century prosecutions by ex parte affidavit as justification for the “testimonial hearsay” rule. See *Davis*, 547 U.S. at 826; *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 43–46, 50–51. In particular, they focus on the case of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason on the basis of untested, ex parte affidavits. *Davis*, 547 U.S. at 828; *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 44. This is the proper context within which to examine the Framers’ intentions with regards to confrontation. Daniel B. Shanes, *Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the New*
them to appear and then to cross-examine those witnesses to test for weaknesses in their testimony.\(^\text{10}\)

On its face, the Confrontation Clause seems to require a blanket prohibition of any statement made by a declarant not testifying at trial.\(^\text{11}\) Such a shallow reading, however, would abrogate centuries of common law precedent recognizing a variety of valid hearsay exceptions.\(^\text{12}\) Treating the words in the Confrontation Clause as a literal command would be far too extreme and out of line with the intentions of the Framers.\(^\text{13}\) Therefore, the challenge for the courts is to balance the constitutionally enshrined preference for face-to-face testimony in criminal trials and the right to cross-examine hostile witnesses with the workaday realities of a functioning criminal justice system.\(^\text{14}\)

In 1980, the Supreme Court set out a test for evidence challenged under the Confrontation Clause that attempted to strike just such a balance.\(^\text{15}\) The Court determined in \textit{Ohio v. Roberts} that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a substantive right to challenge the reliability of evidence at trial.\(^\text{16}\) The defendant in this case was charged with forgery.\(^\text{17}\) At a preliminary hearing, the defense attorney called the daughter of the victim and attempted in vain to get her to admit to authorizing the defendant’s use of the checks and credit cards in question.\(^\text{18}\) At trial, the defendant took the stand and testified that the daughter had in fact authorized him to use those checks and cards.\(^\text{19}\) Between the deposition and the trial, the daughter had run away from home and her whereabouts were unknown.\(^\text{20}\) Consequently, the prosecutor sought to introduce her testimony from the preliminary hearing to rebut the respondent’s statements.\(^\text{21}\) This

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See U.S. CONST amend. VI.
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\item Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); see also Mattox v United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
\item See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80 (“It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.”).
\item Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
\item Id. at 66.
\item Id. at 56.
\item Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
\item Id.
\item Id. at 59.
\item Id. at 59–60.
\item Id. at 59.
\end{enumerate}
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evidence was admitted, the transcript was read to the jury, and the defendant was convicted.\footnote{Id.} The conviction, however, was overturned on appeal.\footnote{Id. at 60; see also State v. Roberts, 378 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ohio 1978) (holding that the testimony at issue did not fall within a recognized hearsay exception and thus violated the defendant’s confrontation right). The Ohio Supreme Court held that here the hearsay exception for prior testimony of an unavailable witness was not properly invoked because the purpose of the prior hearing was not sufficiently related to the subsequent trial. \textit{Id.}}

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.\footnote{Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56.} The Court held that the testimony at the preliminary hearing was admissible under the Confrontation Clause because it bore “sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ and afforded the ‘trier-of-fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’”\footnote{Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)).}

In prior cases the Court had recognized that certain hearsay exceptions “rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”\footnote{Id. at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). In footnote 8 of the opinion, the Court specifically identifies certain types of hearsay exceptions that have been so classified. \textit{Id.} at 66 n.8. See \textit{Mancusi}, 408 U.S. at 215–16 (cross examined prior-trial testimony); \textit{Pointer} v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (same); \textit{Mattox}, 156 U.S. at 244 (dying declaration). Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in \textit{Roberts}, also states “the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions.” \textit{Roberts}, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (quoting J. Broocks Greer, III, Comment, \textit{Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems}, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668 (1970)).} These holdings supported the principle that even if certain evidence is not tested through cross-examination at trial, it is nevertheless constitutionally “safe” because it has either been tested prior to trial, or the surrounding circumstances indicate that the trier-of-fact can trust the evidence.\footnote{Id. at 73 (holding that statements of an unavailable witness were admissible because the testimony had been tested by cross examination at a prior hearing); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).}

These exceptions are “firmly rooted” as they have been examined and tested by the courts over time, and ensure as “strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.”\footnote{Or cross-examination at trial. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) (quoting \textit{Roberts}, 448 U.S. at 66).}
1. The Crawford Revolution

Until 2004, the holding in Roberts was recognized as the proper approach to the problem of reconciling hearsay exceptions with the Confrontation Clause. Courts evaluated the “reliability” of disputed evidence and gave significant weight to exceptions cataloged in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In 2004, however, the Court announced a radical departure from this established process. It abandoned the case-by-case analysis of Roberts, for (at least on the surface) a more dogmatic analysis of the “testimonial/non-testimonial” character of the evidence. According to the majority in Crawford v. Washington, the Roberts Court had its Sixth Amendment analysis wrong: the Confrontation Clause is a procedural guarantee, not a substantive one. And as a procedural right, it does not bow to competing policy interests or notions of judicial efficiency.

In August 1999, Michael Crawford was arrested for murder. Crawford was accused of stabbing Kenneth Lee in Lee’s apartment after Lee allegedly attempted to rape Crawford’s wife. Crawford claimed at trial that he had gone to the victim’s apartment to confront him about this, and while he was there a fight broke out. Crawford claimed that during this fight he stabbed Lee in self-defense.

This version of events conflicted with a statement made by Crawford’s wife to the police on the night of the incident. Crawford’s wife did not testify at trial, but the prosecution introduced the tape recording under the

30 See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124–25; Wright, 497 U.S. at 814; Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182; Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392.
32 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see McEvoy, supra note 16, at 398.
33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
34 Id. at 38.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 39.
After being convicted, Crawford challenged the admission of the tape. The Washington Supreme Court upheld his conviction, concluding that: “although [Crawford’s wife’s] statement did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness.”

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Washington Supreme Court. While the Roberts Court held that the Confrontation Clause provides a substantive right to reliable evidence, Justice Scalia stated that the Clause is primarily concerned with ensuring direct, face-to-face confrontation at trial.

In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia took a long view of history and drew on sources dating as far back as the Roman Empire. In particular, he focused his attention on one specific incident: the trial, and subsequent execution, of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 for treason. In that trial, the Crown relied primarily on the accusations of Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s supposed co-conspirator. Cobham made a statement accusing Raleigh of treason to the Privy Council prior to trial as well as in a separate letter. While Cobham did not testify at trial, both of these records were read to the jury. Raleigh argued that these statements were coerced, but his entreaties to bring Cobham before the jury for cross-examination were ignored.

The fallout of the Raleigh “show trial” influenced both British and American jurisprudence by solidifying the importance of confrontation and cross-examination. The Crawford opinion highlights how attempts by the Government to introduce untested ex parte evidence were met with resistance in both England and the Colonies. Moreover, the primacy of

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39 See WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003). She admitted in the statement that she led Crawford to Lee’s apartment and thus facilitated the assault. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. Crawford’s wife did not testify at trial because her testimony was subject to the spousal privilege under the Washington Rules of Evidence. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994).

40 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41 (citing State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002)).

41 Id. at 57.

42 Id. at 43.

43 Id. at 44.

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 See, e.g., King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696) (holding that in a misdemeanor libel case, the statement of a dead witness could not be introduced because the defendant did not have a chance to cross examine); Lord Fenwick’s Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537,
face-to-face confrontation was recognized even after the drafting of the Constitution. Justice Scalia cited opinions from the early years of the American republic in which the requirement of face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination continued to be “uncompromising.”

The Crawford Court specifically rejected the Roberts reliability test. In its place, the Court stated that any testimonial evidence not testified to at trial will be excluded, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had previously cross-examined the testimony. According to Justice Scalia, under the Roberts regime, courts had lost sight of this important principle of trial procedure. The central holding of Crawford is that admission into evidence of a tape-recorded witness statement to police officers violates the Constitution’s uncompromising mandate. According to Justice Scalia, the Confrontation Clause excludes all testimonial hearsay evidence. In this new regime, there is no room for an inquiry into reliability. The Court went so far as to ridicule such a standard, remarking that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”

What Crawford lacks, however, is a specific definition of what “testimonial evidence” really means. The Court defended its incomplete description by arguing that the opinion need only focus on the core or “nucleus” of the Clause. As the statements at issue in Crawford fit well within this core, the Court needed to opine no further. Yet even the extent of this core is not clearly defined. At times the Court’s logic implies that the subjective intent of the declarant is primary in determining the scope of

50 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49.
51 Id. (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794) and State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844)).
52 Id. at 53–54.
53 Id. at 60 (“Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.”).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 61 (“[The Court imposes] an absolute bar to statements that are testimonial, absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine . . . .”).
56 Id. at 62.
57 Id. at 51–52.
58 Id.
“testimony.” Bearing testimony against a person requires that the “bearer” intend to expose the person to some liability. At other times the Court articulated that the test is whether the “objective” witness would reasonably understand that the testimony would later be available at trial. Given the ambiguity of the holding, it took only two years for the Court to again take up this issue and attempt to clarify the expanse of “testimony.”

2. Davis and Hammon: The Purpose of the Inquiry.

In 2006, the Court took the opportunity to further elaborate on its initial definition of testimony announced in Crawford. The Court in Davis v. Washington contrasted the factual settings of two cases to articulate a more exact definition of “testimonial” evidence. Both fact patterns deal with police response to reports of domestic violence. In the first situation the primary purpose of the inquiry eliciting the testimony was to properly respond to an “ongoing emergency.” In the second, the primary purpose was to collect evidence for trial.

The facts in Davis are as follows: a victim of domestic violence placed a call to a 911 operator. She told the operator that her boyfriend was in the process of assaulting her. In the course of the conversation, the operator determined that the boyfriend’s name was Adrian Davis. Later in the call, the victim reported that Davis had run out of the house. The operator remained on the phone and collected more information on the boyfriend and the basis of the domestic dispute.

Davis was charged with assault, but his ex-girlfriend did not appear to testify at trial. The prosecution attempted to introduce the transcript of the

59 Id. at 51 (“Testimony, in turn, is typically [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”) (internal quotations omitted).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 52 (“[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”) (internal quotations omitted).
62 547 U.S. 813 (2006). The two cases which were consolidated for this matter were: State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) and Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
63 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–18, 828.
64 Id. at 819–20.
65 Id. at 817.
66 Id. at 817–18.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 818.
70 Id. at 819.
The facts of the second case, *Hammon v. Indiana*, closely mirror those of *Davis*: the police responded to reports of domestic abuse at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon. When the police arrived at the house, Mrs. Hammon appeared frightened and there was evidence of a struggle. Initially, however, she stated that “nothing was the matter.” Mr. Hammon likewise denied assaulting her. Eventually, after separating Mr. Hammon from Mrs. Hammon, she admitted to one officer that her husband had thrown her to the ground and hit her. She then filled out a battery affidavit.

The state charged Mr. Hammon with domestic battery. Mrs. Hammon was subpoenaed, but did not appear. The prosecutor called the officer who took the statement to testify to its substance. The trial court determined that, under hearsay exceptions for present sense impression and excited utterance, the evidence was admissible.

The Supreme Court determined that these two statements were distinguishable under the Confrontation Clause and held that:

> Statements are non-testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

The Court gave three reasons why statements made during the 911 call in *Davis* are different from statements made to the police in *Hammon* or *Crawford*. First, while the *Davis* statements were made as the events were taking place, the *Hammon* and *Crawford* statements were made after the events in question. Second, the purpose of the 911 operator’s questions was to resolve the ongoing emergency, while the purpose of the

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71 Id.
72 Id. at 819.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 819–20.
77 Id. at 820.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 827.
82 Id.
police officers’ interrogation in both Hammon and Crawford was to investigate a past crime. Finally, the respective formalities of the statements were different. The declarant in Crawford made her statement in a police station, responding calmly to direct police questions; the declarant in Davis was “frantic” and speaking from the scene of the alleged crime. The Supreme Court concluded that the portions of the 911 transcript occurring prior to Davis fleeing the house were non-testimonial and admissible. The affidavit and statements at issue in Hammon were testimonial and therefore inadmissible.

Much more recently, the Court has provided additional clarification of the “primary purpose” inquiry articulated in Davis. In Michigan v. Bryant, the Court addressed the admissibility of a dying declaration by a shooting victim identifying the perpetrator. The Court held that a shooting suspect at large constituted an ongoing emergency and that statements elicited in an attempt to respond to that emergency were admissible under Crawford.

B. TOOLS FOR TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS

Several years before the Court began to reevaluate the Confrontation Clause, Congress reevaluated and rearticulated the standards for gathering foreign intelligence. As we will see below, these changes implicate one another.

1. “Primary Purpose” in FISA

In October 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Under FISA, the government is permitted to conduct surveillance and searches in pursuit of foreign intelligence material without showing the normal probable cause to believe a crime had been

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83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 828–29.
86 Id. at 828–30. While the Court held that the 911 conversation was non-testimonial, it noted that this only applies to the part of the conversation that took place while the declarant was being attacked. The later part, after Davis left the house, was not addressed, but it was hinted that it could be considered testimonial. Id. at 828–29.
88 Id. In analyzing the objective circumstances of the statements, the Court applied the underlying logic of the traditional hearsay rules. Id. at 1155.
89 The Court’s analysis focused on the objective circumstances of the questioning, including the formality of the interaction and the actions of the officers. Id. at 1160-61; see also id. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
committed. FISA was designed to fill the legal gaps left by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Both the Court and Congress had recognized the Executive Branch’s need to collect certain information in order to satisfy its constitutional duties. Additionally, in certain contexts this power could be exercised without invoking the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, during the 1960s and 1970s, past abuses of executive power, specifically with regards to wiretapping and information gathering, prompted a reevaluation of permissible government surveillance activities. FISA therefore set out the standards for collecting foreign intelligence both with and without a warrant.

FISA covers both electronic surveillance and physical searches. Foreign intelligence information is that information which is:

1. Information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against (A) actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

In order to conduct surveillance the Attorney General may apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for a warrant. The court will grant an application if it finds there is probable cause to believe that the target is an agent of a foreign power and that a foreign power (or agent of a foreign power) controls the location at which the surveillance is to be conducted. The requirements for granting a FISA warrant are similar to but less rigorous than the standards under Title III. Whereas under Title III an applicant must show probable cause to believe that the surveillance will turn up evidence of a crime, under FISA the Government must only demonstrate probable cause that the subject of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent.

In addition to information about the subject of the surveillance, the Government is required to show how they will comply with minimization procedures in order to prevent the gathering, retention, or dissemination of

98 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
99 The Attorney General is also authorized under FISA to conduct warrantless surveillance so long as it is directed at foreign powers. Section 102 of the Act provides that “[t]he President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this [subchapter] to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year . . . .” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)). The Attorney General must certify, however, (1) that the surveillance is solely directed at communication exclusively between or among foreign powers, and (2) that there is no “substantial likelihood” that the surveillance will intercept communications of United States citizens. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A–B).
100 An application must contain the following: (1) the identity of the target, (2) location where the surveillance is to be directed, (3) the type of communications sought to be acquired, and (4) the means by which the surveillance shall be conducted. 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
101 Id.
102 Blum, supra note 92, at 276.
103 Id. Under the warrant provision of FISA, an agent of a foreign power can include a United States citizen, provided that the basis for determining the probable cause that the citizen is an agent of a foreign power is not based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A).
nonpublic information.\textsuperscript{104} Determination of these minimization standards is left to the discretion of the Attorney General.\textsuperscript{105}

As originally articulated in the statute, the “purpose” of a FISA investigation had to be the collection of foreign intelligence.\textsuperscript{106} If evidence of criminal wrongdoing was discovered, however, this could still be introduced at trial so long as the requirements of the FISA statute relating to the identity of the target and the minimization procedures were met.\textsuperscript{107}

Therefore, the scope of “purpose” was and still is significant. The exact meaning of the term, however, evolved from the 1980s through the early 2000s.\textsuperscript{108} Prior to the passage of FISA, the Fourth Circuit had analyzed the issue of the use of foreign intelligence information in court and articulated a standard.\textsuperscript{109} That court held in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the primary purpose of an investigation is foreign intelligence gathering, and so information collected is admissible at a subsequent trial.\textsuperscript{110} The court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that a sole purpose test should be adopted, as “almost all foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal investigations.”\textsuperscript{111} Adopting a sole purpose test would require the government to seek judicial warrants whenever it undertook foreign intelligence surveillance.\textsuperscript{112} This

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\item \textsuperscript{104} Procedures must minimize use of “nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information . . . .” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1806(a). The minimization procedures also must articulate how information can be shared between federal agents and agencies. \textit{Id.} § 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Id. §§ 1801(h), 1802(a)(1)(C). Until 1995, the minimization standards were the “standard minimization procedures” generally utilized by the government when conducting electronic surveillance. \textit{In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court}, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA Ct. 2002). Pursuant to these standards, after the information has been collected and processed into an intelligible form, a reviewing official makes a determination as to whether the information is, or “might be,” foreign intelligence. Information would only be “minimized” or discarded if it “could not be” foreign intelligence. \textit{Id.} at 618. If it satisfied this very general standard it was logged and stored so as to allow later recovery and further analysis. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{106} 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
\item \textsuperscript{107} See generally id. § 1806(a–e).
\item \textsuperscript{108} Diane Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, \textit{Piercing the “Historical Mists”: The People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the “Wall,”} 17 STAN. L. & POL’y REV. 437, 452–53 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{109} United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
\item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.} at 915; \textit{see also} Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (explaining the exclusionary rule).
\item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{Truong}, 629 F.2d at 915.
\item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id.} at 916.
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fails to acknowledge the government’s legitimate interest in conducting this type of surveillance.113

After FISA, other federal courts applied the holding in Truong to the new statute, and determined that the primary purpose of the investigation needed to be intelligence gathering.114 In denying a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence collected through a FISA warrant, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York cited Truong and stated “surveillance under FISA is appropriate only if foreign intelligence surveillance is the Government’s primary purpose.”115 In addition to the Second and Fourth Circuits, other courts from around the country weighed in on this issue and determined that, pursuant to Truong, “purpose” as articulated in FISA should be interpreted to mean “primary purpose.”116

While not addressed by the Supreme Court, this standard was adopted by the Justice Department (DOJ).117 Under its FISA mandate to “minimize” misuse of information, DOJ regulated contact between its Criminal Division and the FBI to ensure that the “primary purpose” of its FISA warrants was not compromised.118 The official line, articulated in the 1995 Protocols, was that when facts collected under FISA “reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed,” the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), in conjunction with the FBI, can notify the Criminal Division.119 Otherwise operations are kept separate. In practice, these protocols built a “wall” between the various departments as the specific requirements attached to

113 Id.
114 United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that primary purpose applies to FISA); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); see also United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the test but not deciding on its applicability).
116 Johnson, 952 F.2d, at 572 (First Circuit holding that primary purpose applies to FISA); see also Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 964 (Ninth Circuit acknowledging the primary purpose test).
119 Id. at A(1).
information transfer became so complex that sharing during the late 1990s simply was not done.\textsuperscript{120}

The guidelines adopted in 1995 assured that “FISA information could almost never be shared with criminal investigators.”\textsuperscript{121} Adopting the primary purpose standard encouraged thinking critically about the involvement of criminal investigators in FISA investigations, but erecting a wall was, in hindsight, an overreaction. The consequence of this overreaction became clear in September 2001.

Following the September 11 attacks, the government tried to determine what failures or oversights prevented the plot from being uncovered and the perpetrators stopped.\textsuperscript{122} Soon it became clear that restrictions on information sharing imposed within the DOJ had seriously hindered the ability of the government to track and respond to the threat.\textsuperscript{123} In October 2001, Congress passed the United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act).\textsuperscript{124} This collection of legislation covered a wide array of areas: it increased the emergency surveillance period from twenty-four to seventy-two hours, expanded the use of electronic and physical searches, and extended surveillance periods from 90 to 120 days.\textsuperscript{125}

Arguably the most significant change brought about by the PATRIOT Act, however, was the addition of a single word to 50 U.S.C. § 1804. This statute governed applications for warrants from the FISC.\textsuperscript{126} The PATRIOT Act added the word “significant” immediately before the word “purpose.”\textsuperscript{127} In doing so, Congress effectively knocked out the foundation of the wall that had been built within the DOJ.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{120} Blum, \textit{supra} note 92, at 281. This does not mean it was impossible. Some contact continued: information gathered under a FISA warrant could pass between the FBI and the Criminal Division if it was determined to relate to a “significant federal crime.” 1995 Protocols, \textit{supra} note 117, at A(1). The Criminal Division could also provide “advice” in intelligence operations to better preserve the option of later criminal prosecution. \textit{Id.} at A(6).

\textsuperscript{121} Blum, \textit{supra} note 92, at 281 (quoting \textit{John Yoo, War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror} 81 (2006)).


\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{125} Blum, \textit{supra} note 92, at 280.

\textsuperscript{126} 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2001); Blum, \textit{supra} note 92, at 281–82; see also William C. Banks, \textit{The Death of FISA}, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1209, 1267 (2007).

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id.} 218, 115 Stat. at 291.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.}
issue FISA warrants in investigations where the primary purpose was not foreign intelligence gathering. Requiring only that intelligence gathering be a “significant purpose” implies that agents can use FISA’s secret and more permissive procedures when their primary purpose was to gather evidence for criminal prosecution.

By early 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft had revoked Reno’s 1995 procedures and instituted a new set of minimization procedures. According to Ashcroft, “[t]he USA Patriot Act allows FISA to be used for ‘a significant purpose,’ rather than the primary purpose, of obtaining foreign intelligence information.” Thus, it allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remains. These 2002 Protocols stated that “[t]he Criminal Division and OIPR shall have access to all information developed in full field [Foreign Intelligence (FI)] and [Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI)] investigations.” In general “[t]he FBI, the Criminal Division, and OIPR shall consult with one another concerning full field FI and FCI investigations” and “[t]he FBI, the Criminal Division, and OIPR shall meet regularly to conduct consultations.” Criminal prosecution and foreign intelligence gathering were melded under the amended FISA, which allowed prosecutors to take advantage of the more deferential warrant standards when conducting investigations.

The FISA Review Court upheld Ashcroft’s protocols and the significant purpose standard later that year. That court held that the significant purpose test satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In its decision, the court specifically stated that under this new standard, the primary purpose of the relevant investigation could be criminal prosecution.

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129 Id.
130 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000)).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Blum, supra note 92, at 282–83.
137 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
138 Id. at 737.
139 Id. at 735 (holding the intelligence interest must only be “measurable”).
While other federal courts are split, if the significant purpose test is ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court, there will be profound consequences for criminal prosecutions utilizing FISA evidence. Most pressing for terrorism prosecution is that while the significant purpose test makes it easier for the government to collect information, it may simultaneously make it more difficult to later introduce this evidence at trial.

2. CIPA and “Classified” Evidence

In addition to providing alternative means for gathering foreign intelligence information, the federal government has created alternative means for introducing that evidence at trial. The challenge is that the same government interests that motivate a separate standard for gathering information under FISA also compel the government to keep collected information secret. The struggle over how and when to allow defendants access to classified information is not a new problem, and Congress has already provided the government an alternative to producing classified evidence at trial.

Historically, prosecutors were often put in a difficult position when a court determined that classified information needed to be disclosed. Generally, they had only two options: either disclose the information or dismiss the case. This lead to a practice called “graymail” where

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140 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 92, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the significant purpose test accepted by the FISA Review Court, but declining to consider the constitutionality in the immediate case); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 333 n.6 (4th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the new standard but applying the pre-PATRIOT Act standard); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996–97 (D. Minn. 2008) (expressing concern with the constitutionality of the significant purpose test); Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 2007) (declining to adopt FISA Review Court’s logic). But cf. United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that “significant purpose” does not offend the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 308 n.9 (D. Conn. 2008) (adopting the significant purpose test); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (reiterating the court’s previous holding in favor of significant purpose).

141 Upholding the significant purpose test would be consistent with the Court’s recent decisions adopting ever-larger exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to police recordkeeping mistakes); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“[Exclusion] has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1995) (articulating the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).

142 See infra note 152.


144 McEvoy, supra note 16, at 405.
defendants would request classified information, on the hope that the court
would grant their request and the prosecution would decide to drop the
case.145

In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA).146 In essence, CIPA increased the relevance threshold that
defendants must meet in order to introduce classified information.147
Unlike regular evidence, which must simply be relevant, CIPA requires
classified information to be highly relevant or material.148

Either party may initiate CIPA proceedings before trial.149 If the
defense wants to introduce classified information, the prosecutor may
challenge this by filing a motion with the judge.150 The motion itself
remains confidential, and the judge must decide if the information is
discernable.151 If she does, however, the prosecution must produce either
the evidence requested or an adequate substitute.152 Pursuant to CIPA,
prosecutors may provide defendants affidavits summarizing classified
information in lieu of those defendants subpoenaing actual testimony.153
The adequacy of substitute information is dependent upon the facts of the
case.154

The Fourth Circuit debated the precise nature of an adequate substitute
in United States v. Moussaoui.155 Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in 2001
for immigration violations, but six additional charges were later added

145 Id.
147 McEvoy, supra note 16, at 400–01; see also 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6.
148 McEvoy, supra note 16, at 400–01. Defendants must also alert the prosecution as to
any classified information they intend to introduce at trial. Id.
149 Id. at 406.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 406–07 (stating that the defendant is not entitled to view the motion).
152 18 U.S.C. § 6(c) provides:

(1) Upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of specific classified
information under the procedures established by this section, the United States may move that, in
lieu of the disclosure of such specific classified information, the court order—(A) the
substitution for such classified information of a statement admitting relevant facts that the
specific classified information would tend to prove; or (B) the substitution for such classified
information of a summary of the specific classified information.
153 Id.
154 See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 157–58 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming the
trial court’s rejection of proposed substitutions that failed to inform the jury of facts deemed
essential to the defendant’s argument). A defendant has more than a basic right to present
evidence material to his defense; substituted information must go beyond the bare facts of
the case and allow the jury to understand the relevant context in which those facts are
situated. Id. at 158.
155 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’g on reh’g 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
relating to his purported involvement in the September 11 attacks. At trial, Moussaoui sought to introduce the testimony of individuals being held at Guantanamo Bay. The trial court determined that substituted evidence must not “materially disadvantage the defendant.” The trial court denied Moussaoui’s request for classified documents, but allowed him to depose inmates of Guantanamo Bay.

The Fourth Circuit held that classified exculpatory evidence could be introduced through the CIPA summary substitution procedure but that inculpatory evidence could not. The prosecutor challenged this on the basis of completeness. He argued that drawing a stark line between inculpatory and exculpatory statements in such an affidavit would strip it of its usefulness; lacking context, the information summarized therein would lack probative value for the jury. The Fourth Circuit allowed the inclusion of inculpatory information, provided the Government did not use this “as a means of seeking the admission of inculpatory statements that neither explain nor clarify the statements designated by Moussaoui.”

While Moussaoui addressed a number of important issues, many still remain. The case did not address the question of how CIPA could be used when the prosecution sought to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief. Additionally, the witnesses in the Moussaoui case were already in United States custody. The costs to the Executive would be higher if a defendant had to be given access to individual Government witnesses who were not in custody or not in the United States. Both issues would be relevant should FISA material be challenged on a Crawford basis.

Future trials of terrorism suspects will inevitably involve classified information and the desire to protect such information has been a central preoccupation of the government in resisting civil trials.

156 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457.
157 Id. at 458.
158 Id. at 477.
159 Id. at 476.
160 Id. at 482.
161 Id. at 481. The Federal Rules of Evidence state: “When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” FED. R. EVID. 106.
162 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 481.
163 Id. at 482.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 465.
166 See Friedman, supra note 31, at 574.
III. “CONFRONTING” FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

_Davis_ and _Crawford_ provided a rough outline of the Court’s current reasoning with respect to the Confrontation Clause. The standard for determining what evidence is excluded by the Clause raises potential problems, however, for prosecutors—specifically in the area of foreign intelligence.

A. FISA, CIPA, AND APPLYING THE NEW CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Both FISA and _Davis_ couch their respective analyses in the context of intent of the government agent in collecting information.¹⁶⁸ When that intention is criminal prosecution, however, the exclusionary consequences of _Davis_ implicate the admissibility of evidence collected pursuant to FISA and presented under CIPA.

The first question is whether foreign intelligence information can be considered “testimonial.” To answer this, one must have a clear definition of “testimony.” As was noted above, the Court has been vague in its description of the standard, particularly given the attack it leveled against Roberts. The Court tells us, however, that a statement made to police during an interrogation is clearly testimonial because the objective declarant would understand that this statement would be used at trial.¹⁶⁹ According to the Court, such accusations are precisely the type of evidence the Framers feared based upon a historical record of executive misuse of such statements.¹⁷⁰ The evidence in _Crawford_ is of a type that falls within the core or “nucleus” of the Clause.¹⁷¹ The objective circumstances of the interrogation made it apparent to the declarant that her statements could be used at trial.¹⁷² But while government interrogations may be the “easy case” under this new standard, they are clearly not the only situation in which “testimonial” evidence may be generated.


¹⁶⁸ _See supra_ Part II.


¹⁷⁰ _Id._ at 47–50.

¹⁷¹ _Id._ at 51–52.

¹⁷² The declarant in this case was under arrest at the time she gave her statement, and had been given a _Miranda_ warning. _Id._ at 38. She was under actual (rather than constructive) notice, therefore, that her statements could be used later at trial.
When required to elaborate beyond this core class of statements, the Court shifted the focus of its analysis from one that exclusively addressed the intent of the declarant\textsuperscript{173} to one that considered more objective factors.\textsuperscript{174} Specifically, the Court looked at the purpose of the government questioning.\textsuperscript{175} Unlike Crawford, where the interrogation was removed both geographically and temporally from the events at issue, the statements at issue in Davis were made in the context of “ongoing emergencies.”\textsuperscript{176} The Court was forced to recognize that the police gather information from the public for more reasons than simply prosecuting criminals.\textsuperscript{177} Under ongoing emergency circumstances, statements elicited by the police would not be testimonial because they were not made to “establish or prove some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”\textsuperscript{178} Therefore, depending upon the surrounding circumstances, the intentions of both the individuals making the statements and the officers collecting them may change. Depending upon the extent of that change, the Confrontation Clause implications of the statements may fluctuate as well. Both are therefore relevant.

In explaining its position, the Davis Court highlighted three factors which distinguish statements made to a 911 operator during an ongoing emergency with those made to police officers conducting an interview: (1) the time period in which the statement was made,\textsuperscript{179} (2) the purpose of the questioning,\textsuperscript{180} and (3) the formality of the statement.\textsuperscript{181} Interestingly, wedged in between the two objective factors evidencing the physical context in which the statement was made, the Court introduced to the analysis the subjective intent of the officer. Depending upon the purpose of the officers, the statements or information they elicit may or may not

\textsuperscript{173}Id. at 51 (defining testimony as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact”) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).

\textsuperscript{174}Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[Statements] are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”).

\textsuperscript{175}Id.

\textsuperscript{176}Id. at 822, 827.

\textsuperscript{177}Id.

\textsuperscript{178}Id. at 827 (internal quotations omitted).

\textsuperscript{179}Specifically: was the statement contemporaneous to the events it describes? Id.

\textsuperscript{180}The Court asks rhetorically whether objectively the situation was an ongoing emergency and whether the purpose motivating the officers to elicit the statement was resolution of that emergency. Id.

\textsuperscript{181}Id. The statement at issue in Crawford was made “calmly,” “at the station house,” and was taped. Id. The statement in Davis was frantic, on the phone, and in “an environment that was not tranquil.” Id.
qualify as “testimony.” And in describing an officer’s intent, sufficient to implicate the “testimonial evidence” standard, the Court specifically refers to “primary purpose.”

Therefore, under Crawford and its progeny, the intent of both the government and the declarant are relevant to the testimonial analysis. Granted, intent is not the only factor, and the way in which all the relevant factors interact has not been conclusively shown. In the “simple cases” of direct police interrogation, the officer’s intention makes the consequences of the statement obvious to the declarant: officer intention is clear and a reasonable adult will know that the statements they make might be used against a defendant at trial. Alternatively, in certain “non-core” situations, officer intent may nevertheless be determinative.

While the Court in Davis clearly endorsed an objective, intent-of-the-investigation inquiry to determine the “primary purpose” of the government agent’s behavior, some federal and state courts have disregarded this and focused only on the more objective factors: context and formality. Specifically, several circuits have also looked at the issue of how wiretap evidence fits into the new scheme. One decision, a year after Crawford, indicated that certain statements captured via wiretap do not constitute testimonial evidence. The Third Circuit in United States v. Hendricks held that statements recorded on a wiretap between co-conspirators were not “testimony” because they failed the “formality” test discussed in Crawford. While this holding came before the decision in Davis, later

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182 Id. at 822; Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation.”).


184 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Pilar G. Kraman, Divining the U.S. Supreme Court’s Intent: Applying Crawford and Davis to Multipurpose Interrogations by Non-Law Enforcement Personnel, 23 CRIM. JUST. 30, 33 (2009) (“In Crawford, the Supreme Court focused on the objective view of the declarant; and in Davis the Court created the so-called primary purpose test that focused on the interrogator.”); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.

185 See generally United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The proper inquiry . . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused.”).

186 See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that written approval of a wiretap authorization was admissible under Crawford); United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a wiretapped discussion between co-conspirators was not excluded under Crawford); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that co-conspirator statements from a wiretap were admissible under Roberts and Crawford).

187 See id. at 181. A witness “who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
courts also focused on the “formality” element when evaluating the admissibility of recorded statements between co-conspirators.\textsuperscript{189}

There is reason, however, to believe that the formality element is not the whole story.\textsuperscript{190} Like in \textit{Crawford}, the holding in \textit{Davis} focused on interrogations. The Court indicated, however, that the scope of the new test might incorporate statements generated in other circumstances as well:

Our holding refers to interrogations because . . . the statements in the cases presently before us are the products of interrogations—which in some circumstances tend to generate testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.\textsuperscript{191}

Specifically responding to the attempt by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion to classify testimonial evidence based upon formality, the Court questioned whether such a test is “workable.”\textsuperscript{192}

The Court in \textit{Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts} drew on this dicta and held that formal interrogation (or any government questioning whatsoever) is not required under the Confrontation Clause to produce testimony. In \textit{Melendez-Diaz}, the Court analyzed a challenge to a chemical analysis report and affidavit completed by a lab technician in a narcotics case.\textsuperscript{193} When arresting the defendant, police discovered several small plastic bags containing a fine white powder.\textsuperscript{194} The powder was submitted to the

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{\textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 51. The Title III recordings here at issue are much more similar to the latter than the former.}
\footnote{United States v. Valle-Martinez, 336 F. App’x 720, 724 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] question posed by the other speaker was not ‘testimonial.’”); United States v. Fleming, F. App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining that video tapes of defendant meeting with confidential informant did not qualify as testimonial because they were not “solemn declarations”); United States v. Davis, 270 F. App’x 236, 248 n.9 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that statements by a confidential informant on a wiretap, not introduced for truth of the matter asserted, were non-testimonial); \textit{see also} United States v. Emmanuel 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a \textit{Crawford} challenge to wiretap authorization was not preserved for trial).}
\footnote{Friedman, \textit{supra} note 31, at 567 (“A statement is not rendered non-testimonial by the absence of formalities . . . . A rule that only formal statements will be characterized as testimonial is . . . theoretically backwards.”).}
\footnote{Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822–23 n.1 (2006). In addition, the majority opinion casts doubt on the position that “formality” and “solemn” declaration are interchangeable. \textit{Id.} at 830–31 n.5.}
\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 830–31 n.5. (“The dissent, in attempting to formulate an exhaustive classification of its own, has not provided anything that deserves the description ‘workable’—unless one thinks that the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ statements . . . qualifies.”).}
\footnote{Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).}
\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 2530.}
\end{footnotesize}
Massachusetts state crime laboratory for analysis.\textsuperscript{195} The tests determined the substance was cocaine.\textsuperscript{196} The technician who performed the tests did not testify at trial, but did provide a “certificate of analysis” describing the weight of the bags, the tests performed and the results.\textsuperscript{197} The defendant was found guilty.\textsuperscript{198} The Supreme Court, however, reversed the verdict, holding that such reports are inadmissible.\textsuperscript{199}

The certificate at issue in that case was prepared specifically for use at the petitioner’s trial. This type of government-prepared evidence is analogous to the statement of Lord Cobham introduced against Sir. Walter Raleigh.\textsuperscript{200} For the same reasons the Court highlights in \textit{Crawford}, the certificate is inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.\textsuperscript{201} This case, however, did not fully resolve the distinction between the subjective intent of the declarant and the objective intent of the interrogation.

The utility of focusing too much on objective factors indicating declarant intent breaks down, however, if the declarant cannot be reasonably expected to understand how those factors impact the consequences of their statements. For example, this problem is obvious in the context of child witnesses.\textsuperscript{202} The Supreme Court of Oregon held in \textit{State v. Mack} that the statements made by a three-year-old witness about alleged sexual abuse fell within the core class of testimonial hearsay excluded under \textit{Crawford}.\textsuperscript{203} In determining that the statements were testimonial, however, the court did not evaluate them based upon declarant intent.\textsuperscript{204} A declarant-centric test would result in admission of evidence that “would offend” \textit{Crawford}’s rigid standards.\textsuperscript{205} In this case, rather, the testimony was deemed testimonial as the child’s statements were elicited by a caseworker \textit{at the behest of police officers}.\textsuperscript{206} The officers’ intent, not the declarant’s, was determinative. Oregon is not alone; other states have

\begin{footnotes}
\item[195] Id.
\item[196] Id.
\item[197] Id. at 2531.
\item[198] Id.
\item[199] Id. at 2532.
\item[200] Id. at 2535.
\item[201] Id.
\item[202] Kraman, \textit{supra} note 184, at 32 (noting that various state courts do not look at declarant intent in the context of children and that this result makes sense if the primary purpose of the interrogation is to collect evidence for trial).
\item[203] 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004).
\item[204] Id.
\item[205] Kraman, \textit{supra} note 184.
\item[206] Mack, 101 P.3d at 353.
\end{footnotes}
followed suit by utilizing an analysis that evaluates the subjective intent of the investigators, not only the subjective awareness of the declarant.207

Assuming that objective factors like formality are not determinative in judging “testimonial” evidence, the CIPA and the 2002 Protocols for FISA may raise significant confrontation problems.

A showing of primary purpose is the thread that connects the Fourth and Sixth Amendments in this case. In both Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases after Crawford, the Court articulated the Clause’s overarching aim of excluding ex parte testimonial evidence generated by the government.208 The Court takes the position that the testimonial standard has a broad reach.209 By inquiring into the officers’ intention in eliciting statements in Davis, the Court opened the testimonial standard to encompass both freely given, and possibly surreptitiously recorded, statements.210 The holdings in both Davis and Crawford only address actual police interrogation. Advances in technology since the trial of Walter Raleigh have made the government less dependent upon the interrogations of witnesses, but the danger of government abuse remains the same. There is no apparent reason why evidence collected through wiretaps or physical searches could not be deemed testimonial if it satisfies the Crawford and Davis criteria.211

Let us therefore turn to the statutes themselves. The Court in Davis indicated that the primary purpose of an interrogation was relevant in deciding whether a statement was testimonial.212 If that purpose is criminal prosecution, the statement may be found testimonial, and therefore barred.213 FISA has become a powerful law enforcement tool, and one in which the government has shown great interest.214 Under the more lax

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209 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
210 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
211 Justice Scalia specifically notes in Davis that statements made in the absence of interrogation can be testimonial and therefore excluded under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 822–23 n.1.
212 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding that when the circumstances indicate that the primary purpose of government action is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to future prosecution, the statements made are testimonial); see also Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 359 (noting the Davis Court’s focus on the intent of the police-questioner).
213 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
214 Since 2002, the number of FISA applications has almost doubled. In 2002, the government applied for, and was granted, 1228 FISA warrants. In 2007 the government applied for 2371 and received 2370. This is a 93% increase. Electronic Privacy Information
standards for FISA warrants in the wake of September 11, the FBI may utilize FISA in instances where criminal prosecution is the primary purpose of the investigation, so long as foreign intelligence gathering is a significant purpose. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2006).

Given the DOJ’s new protocols, involvement by prosecutors is encouraged during FISA investigations. 216

It should be noted that both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have said the testimonial standard does not reach statements made in the furtherance of a conspiracy. 217 This would seem to carve out a chunk of the information collected through FISA wiretaps. But it does not exempt wiretaps in general. If the Court is serious about tying the Confrontation Clause to its seventeenth-century common law roots, a blanket prohibition on all wiretap evidence seems unlikely. Even though the Court bases its definition on the common law understanding of testimony growing out of the Raleigh trial, logical consistency demands at least some attention be paid to the advances of technology in the last two hundred and fifty years. As Justice Brandeis pointed out in Olmstead, technology provides the government with means of gathering information more subtle than direct interrogation. 218 In Raleigh’s day, collecting evidence was largely limited to face-to-face statements. 219 Now the government has far more subtle means of gathering information about its citizenry.

The Court itself has hinted at this more expansive reading. In Crawford, the majority took issue with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which attempted to insulate existing hearsay exceptions such as the co-conspirator exception, from augmentation. Justice Scalia notes:

> Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar. This consideration does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances. 220

Whether an accusatory statement is made to a police officer or to another person on a tapped phone line, the result is the same: the

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219 Intelligence gathering was limited to eavesdropping, which at the time literally meant standing outside a home and listening. fn 45 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 45 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining eavesdrop: “To stand within the ‘eavesdrop’ of a house in order to listen to secrets.”).
220 Crawford, 547 U.S. at 56 n.7; see also id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
government has collected information, useful for subsequent prosecution, to which it otherwise would not be privy. Given this, it seems apparent that the purpose of a wiretap is relevant to the issue of whether the statements gathered through its use are admissible under *Davis* and *Crawford*. Unfortunately, under this new testimonial standard, this evidence would be excluded regardless of its reliability.

Like evidence generated through FISA warrants, evidence introduced through CIPA procedures may be barred under the Confrontation Clause. In *Melendez-Diaz*, the Court held that lab reports were barred under *Crawford*.\textsuperscript{221} In the foreign intelligence context, the most analogous document to the lab reports excluded in *Melendez-Diaz* is the substitute evidence provided by the government under CIPA. In that context, the Court extended the bounds of excluded testimonial evidence past mere perception witnesses.\textsuperscript{222} By crossing this barrier, the Court nullified many of the policy arguments that might support an exception for CIPA. The voluntariness of a CIPA substitution, the relative contemporaneous nature of its recording, and the fact that it does not (itself) make a direct criminal accusation, are all irrelevant to the determination of its admissibility.\textsuperscript{223} Moreover, under the historic examples of governmental abuses drawn by the Court in its prior holdings, the affidavits at issue in *Melendez-Diaz* were significantly more innocuous than substitute evidence under CIPA,\textsuperscript{224} and arguably more damning than wiretap information gleaned from FISA warrants.

**B. THE COSTS OF CONFRONTATION**

The federal government has significant powers to prosecute international terrorism, and in the past decade it has had cause for exercising those powers.\textsuperscript{225} Should *Crawford*'s testimonial exclusion apply

\textsuperscript{221} See infra section III.B.1.

\textsuperscript{222} *Melendez-Diaz* v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009) (holding that it does not matter if the statement is not “conventional” or of a type typically considered by the Court in the context of Confrontation).

\textsuperscript{223} See id.

\textsuperscript{224} *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 52 (stating ex parte examination of the sort used at Raleigh’s trial have “long been thought a paradigmatic confrontation violation.”).

\textsuperscript{225} Under federal law, individuals can be prosecuted for terrorist acts committed both on United States soil as well as abroad. Robert M. Chesney, *Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventative Detention Debate*, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 669, 677–78 (2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(a), (c) (2006)). The federal government can charge an individual for murder of a U.S. national committed on U.S. soil upon issuance of a certificate by the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2006). This presents the problem of trying cases where the scene of the crime and witnesses might be located thousands of miles away from the courthouse.
to evidence either collected under FISA’s warrants or introduced through CIPA, however, the result would complicate the already challenging task facing federal prosecutors. Excluding evidence gathered under FISA’s new permissive standard would mitigate some of the risks associated with allowing criminal investigation under the aegis of intelligence gathering. In the context of domestic prosecutions, the benefits of such exclusion might outweigh the cost. On the other hand, the exclusion of evidence collected under FISA warrants in terrorism trials would be more problematic. Additionally, finding CIPA’s substitution procedures unconstitutional would disrupt a necessary, if imperfect, legislative balancing act. In context of both statutes, the complexity and importance of the competing interests demands a legislative solution that weighs the demands of the parties. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court addressed the question of when Crawford takes governmental interests into consideration in its new standard last spring. The answer was a resounding “never.”

1. Melendez-Diaz: Costs Begin to Come into Focus

The Court in both Davis and Crawford implies that its new rule is less complex and open to interpretation than the prior reasonableness standard. By imposing a “wooden” standard, the Court has attempted to clamp down on inappropriate judicial judgment calls. Yet even with this standard, the analysis the lower courts must undertake is no less opaque. And the resultant uncertainty imposes costs on both defendants and prosecutors. Unlike Roberts, where the parties shared the burden of uncertainties, here challenges posed by the practical applications of Crawford seem directed exclusively at prosecutors.

Since the Crawford decision came down in 2004, legal scholars have attempted to draw attention to the potential costs this new standard would

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227 It certainly would not fix all the problems, however.
228 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
229 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”).
230 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545. Writing after the Davis opinion came down, Richard Friedman predicts the possibility that as a consequence of the Court’s primary purpose language, the new standard may only impose costs on the prosecution. Friedman, supra note 31, at 574–75 (noting that there are situations where a court may deem evidence testimonial, but the expense of providing a live witness is exorbitant and the accused seems to have no plausible expectation that confrontation would do him any good) (citing Metzger, supra note 8)).
231 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545.
impose. The first practical question to be taken up by the Court was
decided in June 2009. The Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts was
asked to determine whether the costs to the government could be considered
under its new standard. The Court responded “no” and emphasized that
the burden of its new standard lay squarely at the prosecutor’s feet.
“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to
present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses
to court.”

The majority in Melendez-Diaz commented on how the question of lab
reports/affidavits called for a “straightforward” application of the
testimonial standard from Crawford. While the declarant in Crawford
was determined to have been objectively aware that her words could be
used later at trial, the statements contained in the report and affidavit at
issue in Melendez-Diaz were made with the actual intent that they be
introduced at trial.

The prosecution put forward four arguments attempting to distinguish
the declarant in this case from other types of perception witnesses. They
argued that the technician is not an “accusatory” witness or one who
directly accuses the defendant of wrongdoing. They argued that the
technician is not “conventional” in that they did not observe the facts salient
to the crime. They asserted that because the statements were not elicited
through interrogation they fall outside of the Crawford/Davis rule. And
finally, they pointed out that the witness is not recounting historic facts

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232 Some of the cost issues which have thus far been raised include those related to child
testimony and testimony in domestic abuse cases. See Kimberly Y. Chin, “Minute and
Separate”: Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases After Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 71 (2010); G.
Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 80–81 (2009). Battered women and abused children are frequently
the only witnesses to the crimes perpetrated on them, but are often unable or unwilling to
testify. See Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 315, 327 (2009). In such instances, a rigid confrontation rule would bar charges
from being brought. Id.

233 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527.
234 Id. at 2540.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 2532–33.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 2533.
241 Id. at 2535.
242 Id.
“prone to distortion” but rather reporting scientific fact, the “result of 
neutral, scientific testing.”243

The Court, however, held that none of these factors are relevant to its 
Confrontation Clause analysis. It may be true, the majority noted, “that 
there are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or 
verify the results of a forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one 
way: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation 
Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”244

2. Costs Specific to Terrorism Trials245

Given its responsibilities enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, the 
Executive has certain recognized interests in collecting foreign 
intelligence.246 The Executive also has the responsibility to prosecute 
suspected criminals.247 These interests can coincide, and when they do, the 
competing interests of fair trial and information control need to be 
reconciled. In the context of international terrorism prosecutions, one 
particular problem is the government’s limited ability to compel appearance 
of potentially relevant witnesses.248 The general solution to this problem 
has been the hearsay exceptions articulated in the Federal Rules of

243 Id. at 2536 (internal quotations omitted). The State also pointed out that the 
documents are akin to business records admissible at common law. Id. at 2538.
244 Id. at 2536.
245 For a discussion of some of the costs specific to terrorism trials, see Chesney, supra 
note 225, at 705 (noting that while there are few examples of terrorism trials being derailed 
due to adverse evidentiary rulings, what is unclear is the extent to which individuals are not 
being criminally prosecuted because of procedural evidentiary hurdles); see generally S. Rep. 
No. 96-823 (1980).
246 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 n.26 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“The Government is charged not only with the task of bringing wrongdoers 
to justice, but also with the grave responsibility of protecting the lives of the citizenry.”).
247 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”); see also United States v. Sitka, 666 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Conn. 
1987) (“This duty to execute the laws is a broad power not specifically limited to powers 
enumerated in the text of the Constitution.”).
248 In the United States, defendants have the right to secure the attendance of witnesses 
on the issuance of a subpoena by the courts. United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. 341 (1800) 
(Opinion of Chase, J.). Under federal law, a court can issue a subpoena on an individual 
living outside of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2006), see also Blackmer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (upholding a statute under which a U.S. national living abroad 
was held in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena issued by a federal court). That 
being said, the Court in Blackmer stated that its holding was based upon its in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 438. While federal courts now analyze the issue 
through the lens of “minimum contacts,” the consequence remains the same: non-citizen 
 witnesses living abroad are not necessarily subject to federal process. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Evidence. In the context of foreign intelligence, specifically, Congress has created a flexible regulatory scheme designed to address the competing interests through evidentiary substitution.

Since the government amended the FISA standards in 2001, evidence gathered pursuant to these warrants has played an increasingly significant role at trial. Terrorism trials tend to involve a great deal of electronic surveillance. In one case from 2003, United States v. Al-Arian, the evidence at trial included 21,000 hours of telephone recordings collected under FISA. The evidence in another case from 2004, United States v. Hassoun, included 275 transcripts of recorded conversations and over 300 summaries of those intercepts, whittled down from 10,000 to 12,000 pages of materials. In a third case, United States v. Sattar, the Government made extensive disclosures prior to trial including 85,000 audio recordings, written summaries of 5,300 voice calls, and 10,000 pages of e-mails.

The ability to collect and store vast quantities of information has not made the process of analyzing that information any less costly. This is a challenge not just for the federal government during terrorism trials but for civil discovery procedures in general. Moreover, the challenges of having individuals testify to such voluminous information assumes that the Government even has access to the declarants who are recorded on the relevant tapes. Should the courts determine that the significant purpose standard for FISA warrants triggers the “testimonial” exclusion at trial, terrorism trials in Article III courts will require the production of all the individuals making statement on these tapes. This is a difficult prospect. FISA warrants cover conversations...

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249 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 107 (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence have largely been up to the task in the context of terrorism trials).
250 Id. at 85.
251 See infra note 253.
252 Id.
253 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2003). The defendant in this case was prosecuted for allegedly providing material support to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a militia organization in Palestine. Id.
256 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91; see also Robert W. Trenchard, Two Roads Diverge in Managing E-Discovery Costs, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2009, at S6.
between individuals in the United States and elsewhere. Locating and transporting such individuals to domestic courts may prove impossible.

In addition to the admissibility of FISA evidence generally, an overlapping issue is the procedure for admitting classified information. Congress passed CIPA in order to balance the interests of prosecution and defense specifically in the context of classified evidence. The issues raised in Moussaoui have yet to reach the Supreme Court, but on its face, the Fourth Circuit’s decision raises significant Crawford questions. While ostensibly situating its holding under the new testimonial standard, the Fourth Circuit in Moussaoui fell back on a balancing standard reminiscent of Roberts. Despite the fact that the evidence was being used to contextualize other exculpatory evidence, the court allowed introduction of incriminating evidence against the defendant by means of government affidavit. Under all three Supreme Court decisions describing the testimonial rule, such an affidavit would be inadmissible. Plus, any mention of “reliability” at all would seem to place it squarely in the Crawford crosshairs.

The challenge that classified information poses for trial practice is as great as the interests at stake are significant. Since its passage in 1980,

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258 There are a number of strategies which have been utilized by courts attempting to mitigate the challenges associated with in person testimony. Zabel and Benjamin provide a comprehensive description of many of the steps taken by courts to accommodate these unique challenges. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 109; see United States v. Re ssam 593 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing pre-Crawford trial verdict against petitioner after court had allowed the deposition of a witness living outside the United States to be introduced as evidence at trial); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1312–18 (11th Cir. 2006) (allowing video conferencing of witness unable to participate at trial). In Yates, the court noted Justice Scalia’s objection to this type of evidence on confrontation grounds. Id. at 1314–15.

259 Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified in 18 U.S.C. app 3 (2006)); S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 3 (1980) (“The purpose of this bill is to help ensure that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law and to help strengthen the enforcement of laws designed to protect both national security and civil liberties. Too often the duty of the government to protect legitimate national security secrets and to prosecute lawbreakers have been in conflict. Insofar as possible, [this bill] resolves that conflict.”).

260 United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 468 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Moussaoui . . . has a Sixth Amendment right to [detainees’] testimony . . . [but] this right must be balanced against the Government’s legitimate interest in preventing disruption [Redacted] of the enemy combatant witnesses.”).

261 Id. at 482.

262 Chesney, supra note 225, at 708 (“[W]hile it may be possible [to present declarants at trial] in many instances . . . presumably it will not be possible in some non-trivial number of cases.”).
courts have upheld the constitutionality of CIPA procedures. Starting in the 1980s, it has been heavily relied upon in terrorism cases. It has found success precisely because it is a flexible standard, capable of adapting to the ever-changing prosecutorial environment. The Supreme Court, however, has been explicit in its rejection of any flexibility or balancing of interests in the context of Confrontation. This contradicts the express intention of Congress in fashioning this statute. Moreover, CIPA, while not perfect, does function to ensure that both sides are able to put on an effective case. To remove this scheme would prompt the return of tactics such as “graymail,” which serve only to obstruct the trial process.

Safeguards are needed to protect defendants’ rights at trial, and confrontation is a critical tool for testing the validity and reliability of evidence. But the Federal Rules of Evidence have existed for thirty-five years, and have been shown to provide adequate safeguards against the introduction of unreliable testimony. The Court should return to the reliability standard, not because it provides less protection to the interests of the defendant, but rather because it is more consistent with the aims of the Confrontation Clause itself.

Alternatively, should the Court stand pat, terrorism suspects will not be able to avoid prosecution by “gaming the system” by invoking their constitutional rights. Rather, the government will shift the forum of

265 See United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 796 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“CIPA is neither exhaustive nor explicitly exclusive with respect to the presentation of classified testimony or documents at trial.”).
266 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (holding that despite the “burden[some]” “necessities of the trial and adversarial process” this new standard may entail, the Court cannot water down the rule it has articulated) (internal quotations omitted).
267 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 85 (“Congress’ express intent in enacting CIPA was that federal district judges . . . ‘must be relied upon to fashion creative and fair solutions to these problems.’”) (quoting S. REP. No. 96-283 (1980)).
268 Id. at 87 (“Prior evaluations of CIPA have found that CIPA is effective not only in espionage prosecutions but in terrorism prosecutions as well.”) (internal quotations omitted).
269 See McEvoy, supra note 16, at 405.
270 Metzger, supra note 8, at 501 (noting that each aspect of the Confrontation Clause serves to advance the “search for reliability”).
prosecution—most likely to military tribunals. In essence, by requiring that evidence collected pursuant to FISA warrants always be introduced via live testimony, the Court is incentivizing the use of military tribunals over Article III courts. And these tribunals provide significantly fewer protections for detainees than they would enjoy under the return to a Roberts formulation. More generally, these tribunals weaken our commitment to the rule of law at home while decimating the legitimacy of our legal system abroad.

IV. CONCLUSION: OVERTURN CRAWFORD, REWRITE FISA, OR . . . BOTH?

The Obama Administration has indicated that it believes trying terrorism suspects in Article III courts, with all the rights and privileges that such trials entail, is a worthy goal. This is a laudable position. The demand for terrorism prosecutions will only become more frequent in the future. The attempts to limit the rights of individuals accused of

273 It is possible that the Confrontation Clause issue would not necessarily be resolved by restricting terrorism trials to military courts. Justice Scalia takes great pains to justify his holding in Crawford on the basis of common law principles and fundamental values of the judicial process. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004); Dratel, supra note 5, at 20. The opinion did not just rely on the meaning of confrontation in the abstract, but found the genesis of the right outside of the four corners of the Constitution. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43; Dratel, supra note 5, at 20. Therefore, it could be argued that even defendants facing trial before military tribunals might be able to challenge testimonial evidence. If this were the case, the challenges of Crawford might be exacerbated by the Court’s holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Conspiracy is not recognized as a crime under the law of war. Id. at 603–04. Should the Court not recognize a conspiracy, statements that might otherwise be barred under the Confrontation Clause, could now be introduced.


275 Jerry Markon, Terror Trials in U.S. Are a Worry, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2009, at A4 (“Obama’s nominee for Pentagon general counsel recently told a Senate committee that the president’s ‘predispositions’ are for civilian trials.”).

276 Despite being a party to the drafting Rome Statute, the United States has refused to ratify and join the International Criminal Court (ICC). While one might argue that crimes like international terrorism are best suited for an international forum like the ICC, the United States may be fully capable of exercising jurisdiction over terrorists committing purely international crimes without the ICC. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, any state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern. These include piracy, slave trade, aircraft hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism. Restatement (Third) Law of Foreign Relations § 404. This power is not completely unbounded, and as it has become more frequently utilized, there have been stronger and more frequent calls to curtail it. Dapo
terrorism in the last decade by subjecting them to ad hoc military tribunals has resulted in only five convictions. Conversely, of the 449 defendants charged with terrorism or national security crimes in civilian courts since September 11, 271 have settled with 230 ending in convictions. Nevertheless, despite the impotence of extrajudicial detention at Guantanamo Bay, a political backlash has stymied the Administration’s attempt to focus on prosecuting terrorists in domestic courts. Civilian courts have shown that they are capable of handling terrorism trials. There have been setbacks as well. The challenges that Crawford poses could lend fuel to this particular fire.

In November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four alleged accomplices would be tried in federal court in Manhattan. Despite an initial outpouring of support for this proposal, opposition soon began to build in the city against allowing this to go forward. This sentiment echoed the resistance to moving the suspects held at Guantanamo Bay to United States soil. While much of the criticism has centered on the costs and security concerns associated with both the trial and the transfer, critics have been willing to critique the premise that accused terrorists should be afforded the right to civilian trial.


Id.

Shane, supra note 3.

Haberman, supra note 277.


Savage, supra note 3.


Julie Kirtz, With New York All but Ruled Out, Lawmakers Look for Cheap, Safe Spot for 9/11 Trials, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/31/new-york-ruled-lawmakers-look-cheap-safe-spot-trials (“I think we ought to have three criteria. Number one, where can we try them safely? Where can we try them quickly? And where can we try them inexpensively? I’m for whichever venue accomplishes those things.”) (quoting Sen. Evan Bayh) (internal quotation omitted); Charlie Savage,
As much as political opponents of the Obama Administration’s initial plan may wish the opposite to be true, military tribunals are not the best forum for trying international terrorists. Before courts are ready to take on trials of alleged terrorists, however, the Supreme Court needs to provide a more definite explanation of “testimonial” evidence. Too many questions remain as to the “new” scope of the Confrontation Clause. Terrorism prosecutions present unique challenges to federal prosecutors. The Court’s opinion in *Melendez-Diaz* expressed little concern for the very real logistical challenges the broad testimonial rule announced in that case would imply. Requiring that individuals testify in person to all steps of the chain of custody would require individual custodians to spend significant amounts of time in court and not doing the substantive work they are charged with. Local and state government agencies are already understaffed, and while it may be too early to see the true impact of *Melendez-Diaz*, the decision no doubt imposes real costs on prosecutors which will inevitably translate into fewer legitimate cases being brought to trial.

These logistical challenges are multiplied many times in the context of foreign intelligence. Congress enacted CIPA because it understood that the disclosure of classified information involved real costs. The inevitable impact of the imposition of these costs was the inclination to pursue fewer

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287 See *Haberman*, *supra* note 277 (noting that there have been 230 convictions of terrorism suspects in federal civilian courts since September 11, compared with just five in military commissions).

288 *Melendez-Diaz* v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2544–45 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new Confrontation Clause standard “threatens to disrupt if not end many prosecutions where guilt is clear but a newly found formalism now holds sway”).

289 *Id.* at 2544 (arguing that, since many “people play a role in a routine test for the presence of illegal drugs[,]” it is difficult to determine which person “is the analyst to be confronted under [the majority’s rule]”).


291 S. REP. NO. 96–823, at 3 (1980) (“The Government’s understandable reluctance to compromise national security information invites defendants and their counsel to press for the release of sensitive classified information the threatened disclosure of which might force the government to drop the prosecution.”) (quoting Attorney General Philip Heymann).
criminal convictions. If the Court was to prohibit evidence collected through FISA warrants, and instead insist that individuals recorded under those warrants testify in person, similar costs would be imposed.

Therefore, in addition to providing a more definite definition of testimonial evidence, the Obama Administration and the Congress should abandon the significant purpose test articulated in both the PATRIOT Act and the 2002 Protocols. The Supreme Court has not weighed in on this issue, so perhaps its dismissal of the test will force the Executive’s hand. But regardless, adhering to the significant purpose analysis raises practical problems more immediate than the potential constitutional ones. Fostering a culture of information sharing within government is a positive goal, but the significant purpose test is not the right way to do this. A clear demarcation between domestic investigations and foreign intelligence investigations is essential to the success of both. There is a strong need for more comprehensive foreign intelligence tools, but given the risks involved, they cannot be conflated with existing law enforcement practices. Integrating the two puts the government’s ability to successfully prosecute offenders at risk. This will make the government less willing to use Article III courts, or more willing to flout their determinations if they dismiss claims for evidentiary problems.

A. RETHINK FISA’S PRIMARY PURPOSE STANDARD

The most obvious solution to this problem is to repeal the PATRIOT Act’s augmentation of the preexisting FISA warrant standard. If the Congress is serious about FISA being a foreign intelligence-gathering tool—rather than a criminal prosecution tool—there is no reason justifying this standard. FISA already removes the obligation that the government demonstrate probable cause to secure a warrant—the permissive significant purpose standard practically removes the need for any showing at all.293

292 Id. at 2 (“The more sensitive the information compromised, the more difficult it becomes to enforce the laws that guard our national security.”) (quoting STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE, 95th CONG., REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (Comm. Print 1978)).

293 The federal district court in Mayfield v. United States held in 2007 that the new standard violated the Constitution as a Title III warrant was necessary whenever the primary purpose of an investigation is criminal prosecution. 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 2007). This decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit on the basis of standing without reaching the merits of the claim. Mayfield v. United States, 588 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2009).
B. RETHINK CRAWFORD

A second priority is to overturn Crawford. The Court, however, has made it clear that government interest is not a factor to consider in its new standard, and so policy arguments may fall on deaf ears. Nevertheless, in addition to the specific problems raised by this standard in the context of foreign intelligence evidence, there are deeper structural questions about the justification for the Crawford standard on its own. Specifically, it seems suspect that the testimonial standard has any basis in the actual Constitution.

In Crawford, while the Court parses the historic record for justification of the new standard, it refuses to define specifically what “testimonial” evidence really means in the context of actual practice. After thirty-two pages, the Court ends its opinion by acknowledging that it has not provided a definition of “testimonial” evidence: “We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” Without such a definition, the utility of the testimonial test remained suspect. While courts have attempted several times to fill in this blank spot in the years since Crawford, uncertainty remains as to its true scope. The Court itself acknowledges that the Clause could cover a variety of circumstances: ex

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295 This line of analysis may be questionable in and of itself given that questioning and interrogation by police officers—the subject of Crawford and Davis—was a topic that the common law had not dealt with in 1789. See Bradley, supra note 232, at 322.
296 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The most recent decision has provided some clarification by incorporating the traditional hearsay analysis into the primary purpose determination. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011). Still, as there seems to be some conflict with the initial motivations of the Court when deciding Crawford, it appears plausible that further clarification is still warranted. See id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The majority opinion] is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist narrative in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence . . . .”).
297 While addressing very different subject matter, Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the testimonial standard in Crawford is reminiscent of his dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989). Both tests reject any sort of ad hoc evaluation, and focus rather on the “character” of the power or right at issue. Id. at 427; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004). Confrontation, much like delegation, is a practice that does not lend itself to bright-line rules. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72. While it may be conceptually easier to impose a rigid ban on introducing ex parte testimonial evidence or delegating legislative powers to the courts, the practical demands of both the lawmaking and criminal justice systems demand a more nuanced and flexible guidebook.
298 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[H]olding, without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . . .”); see also United States v. Arnold 486 F.3d 177, 187 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that Crawford did not provide a “comprehensive definition” of the term “testimonial”); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court declined to rigidly define what is meant by the term ‘testimonial.’”).
parte sworn statements such as affidavits, prior testimony, unsworn statements to police officers, or even in-court statements.\textsuperscript{299} Without defining the outer bounds of testimony, application of this rule is no less fluid than a reliability standard and is subject to the same judicial uncertainty.

The problem stems from the Court’s shaky foundation supporting the primacy of testimonial evidence in the Sixth Amendment.\textsuperscript{300} As said above, the central challenge of Confrontation Clause analysis is resolving the tension between the facially restrictive wording of the Clause and the realities of a functional justice system. The Court in \textit{Crawford} implies that too much evidence was getting in under the \textit{Roberts} standard, and therefore sought to impose restrictions.\textsuperscript{301} It seems to be able to avoid the potential pitfall of overextending the Clause by drawing a distinction between “evidence” and “testimony.” Barring “testimonial” evidence keeps a great deal of problematic ex parte statements out, while not simultaneously imposing an unworkable rule.

The question, however, is why the Court can focus on the “bearing of testimony” as the essence of what it means to be a witness.\textsuperscript{302} The concept of “testimony” is the keystone that links “witness”—the word that appears in the text of the Confrontation Clause—and the ex parte formal statements and affidavits the Court is trying to exclude.\textsuperscript{303} The definition that the Court uses is drawn from the 1828 edition of \textit{Webster’s New American Dictionary}.\textsuperscript{304} Having cited only one dictionary definition, however, the

\textsuperscript{299} \textit{Crawford}, 541 U.S. at 50–52. The Court raises but then dismisses the last category, in-court statements, but does so on the basis of the historic precedent it has identified, not any intrinsic quality of “testimony” itself. \textit{Id.} at 50. “[W]e once again reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony . . . . Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices. Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to confront those who read Cobham’s confession in court.” \textit{Id.} at 50–51.

\textsuperscript{300} \textit{Id.} at 69–70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The classification of testimonial versus non-testimonial evidence is arbitrary, at least with regards to the common law. \textit{Id.} The law of testimony non-exclusion was fully developed at the time of the framing. \textit{Id.} at 72. Given that the law of exclusion was in the midst of developing, there is no reason to suspect that the Framers would ascribe to such a wooden and categorical rule. \textit{Id.} at 73.

\textsuperscript{301} \textit{Id.} at 60 (holding that the \textit{Roberts} test departs from historical principles because it admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding).

\textsuperscript{302} This is the “logical hook” upon which the Court hangs its holding in \textit{Crawford}. Justice Scalia asserts that the word “witness” in the Confrontation Clause should be defined as “one who bears testimony,” which in turn is used to justify the Court’s blanket exclusion of any “testimonial evidence.” \textit{Id.} at 51. This judicial sleight-of-hand takes but five sentences and cites to no precedent. \textit{Id.} at 51.

\textsuperscript{303} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Id.}
Court significantly inflates its lexicographic choice by asserting that the bearing of testimony is a more formalized activity than presenting other types of evidence.\textsuperscript{305} Resting such an important point of the analysis on one dictionary definition is suspect, particularly when no reason for using that particular dictionary over another is given.\textsuperscript{306} The logic of the opinion is dependent upon accepting that the definition of “witness” is the bearer of “testimony,” rather than a more general (but no less plausible) definition of “witness,” such as one who bears or presents “evidence.” Should this definition of witnesses be accepted (rather than the more formalized “bearer of testimony”), it would be a much more tenuous inferential leap to establish the type of bright-line rule announced in \textit{Crawford}.

Yet the fact is, one can look elsewhere in legal dictionaries from the period and find alternative definitions of “witness.” For example, a legal dictionary from 1811 defines a witness as “[o]ne who gives evidence in a cause”\textsuperscript{307} and a second from 1848 likewise defines a witness as “one who gives evidence in a cause.”\textsuperscript{308} The “bearer of testimony” definition, while critical for sewing up the logic of the Court’s holding, seems to be only one of several equally plausible options.

This is not to say that \textit{Ohio v. Roberts} was wholly unproblematic. The old reliability standard lacked a unifying theory to ground its application. It typically provided no more protections to defendants than the Federal Rules of Evidence envisioned.\textsuperscript{309} Under this standard, the Confrontation Clause had a limited effect.\textsuperscript{310} While this is potentially a problem to address, the solution is not \textit{Crawford}.

Imposing the rigid testimonial standard in \textit{Crawford} to foreign intelligence might effectively bar certain terrorism trials in federal court. While in other contexts the costs this rigid rule creates might simply result in fewer cases being brought, terrorism trials present a unique situation. The Bush Administration’s experiment with military tribunals raises a possible alternative to the acquittal/dismissal decision the government might otherwise be faced with. It is not entirely clear how the \textit{Crawford}
rule would apply to such commissions, but the “flexible” evidentiary rules of these tribunals would no doubt make them an attractive option to an overzealous administration driven by political pressures to punish terrorists. Nevertheless, these commissions have proven at the very least a political liability and at most a denial of fundamental human rights. They are not a valid option, and to the extent that Crawford incentivizes their use, it should be overruled.