There are growing pressures for the public sector to be more innovative but considerable disagreement about how to achieve it. This article uses institutional and organizational analysis to compare three major public innovation strategies. The article confronts the myth that the market-driven private sector is more innovative than the public sector by showing that both sectors have a number of drivers of as well as barriers to innovation, some of which are similar, while others are sector specific. The article then systematically analyzes three strategies for innovation: New Public Management, which emphasizes market competition; the neo-Weberian state, which emphasizes organizational entrepreneurship; and collaborative governance, which emphasizes multi-actor engagement across organizations in the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. The authors conclude that the choice of strategies for enhancing public innovation is contingent rather than absolute. Some contingencies for each strategy are outlined.

There is growing demand and pressure for the public sector to become more innovative (Borins 2008; Osborne and Brown 2011) in response to rising citizen expectations, dire fiscal constraints, and a number of “wicked problems” that, because of their complexity, cannot be solved by standard solutions or by increasing the funding of existing mechanisms. While the effects of public innovation are sometimes evaluated differently by public and private stakeholders and may involve significant trade-offs (Abrahamson 1991; Hartley 2005; Tidd and Bessant 2009), there is a growing perception that innovation can contribute to increased productivity, service improvement, and problem-solving capacity in the public sector, though not all innovations are effective or involve improvement. However, there seems to be considerable disagreement about how to spur and sustain public innovation. Therefore, in order to better understand the drivers of as well as the barriers to public innovation, this article endeavors to compare three different public innovation strategies in order to show that although market-driven and bureaucratic innovation strategies have important qualities, a collaborative approach to public innovation seems to have some comparative advantages in certain contexts.

In the last two decades, proponents of New Public Management (NPM) reforms have claimed that the public sector should imitate or learn from the private sector. The public sector should become more innovative, flexible, and efficient by introducing market-based competition and private sector management techniques (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Critics claim that the marketization of the public sector has not helped make the public sector more innovative. They suggest instead that public innovation should be enhanced by means of strengthening organizational entrepreneurship in neo-Weberian bureaucracies through a combination of transformational leadership (Bass and Riggio 2006), institutional and organizational integration (Christensen and Lægreid 2010), trust-based management (Nyhan 2000), and increased responsiveness toward the demands from citizens and users of specific public services (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Although these strategic recommendations, under the right conditions, may help spur public innovation, we argue that the dichotomous opposition between market-based competition and bureaucratic reform is an unfortunate and false choice. Unfortunately because both strategies tend to favor “in-house” innovation (i.e., by managers and staff) and thus fail to reap the fruits of inter-organizational, intersectoral, and open innovation. False because a collaborative approach to innovation highlights the role of multiactor engagement in informing the understanding of the problem to be addressed, as well as in creating and implementing innovation and garnering support and ownership of the problem and the innovation. However, although collaborative innovation seems to be supported by new trends associated with New Public Governance (Osborne 2010), there is both merits and limitations of this particular strategy, and it may require the development of new kinds of innovation management.
The argument proceeds in the following way: First, we confront the myth that the market-driven private sector is more innovative than the public sector by showing that both sectors are characterized by a number of drivers of as well as barriers to innovation, some of which are the same, while others are sector specific. These insights are used to critically scrutinize the extent to which NPM can enhance public innovation. After identifying the drivers and limitations of the market competition approach of NPM, we briefly explore the drivers and limitations of the second innovation strategy, which is based on reforming public bureaucracies in order to enhance organizational entrepreneurship. Finally, we analyze the comparative merits of the collaborative approach to public innovation and discuss how the drivers and barriers here might be harnessed by developing new kinds of innovation leadership and management. In the conclusion, we emphasize that this consideration of the drivers and barriers of these three institutional modes indicates that the choice between different strategies for enhancing public innovation is contingent rather than absolute, and we outline some of the contingencies for each strategy. Before proceeding with the argument, we provide a brief outline of our theoretical starting point and define some of the key concepts.

An Institutional Approach to Public Innovation

This article draws on institutional and organizational theories in public administration and governance in order to answer the increasingly important question of how to understand, analyze, and enhance public innovation. Institutional theory asserts that situated actors act within an institutional framework of rules, norms, knowledge, and sedimented discourses (March and Olsen 1989; Peters 2011). The institutional conditions are reproduced in the course of action, but they may also be modified or transformed by intentional or unintentional actions that involve collaboration based on resource interdependency as well as conflicts rooted in different interests, interpretations, and worldviews. The institutional perspective on innovation is important because it draws attention to the organizational and cultural conditions that might hamper or drive social and political actors aiming to produce innovative solutions.

There is no agreement in the literature about how to define the concept of innovation, but in order to avoid conflating innovation with creativity, we insist that innovation not only involves the generation but also the practical realization of new, creative ideas (Damanpour 1991; Van de Ven 1986). Hence, innovation can be defined as a complex and iterative process through which problems are defined; new ideas are developed and combined; prototypes and pilots are designed, tested, and redesigned; and new solutions are implemented, diffused, and problematized. Figure 1 depicts the different analytical phases of the innovation cycle.

Innovation involves change, but not all kinds of change qualify as innovation. Hence, we reserve the notion of innovation for those forms of change that break with the established practices and mindsets of an organization or organizational field to create something new (Damanpour 1991), so that innovation is a step change or a disruptive change (Lynn 1997; Osborne and Brown 2011). Innovation can be either radical or incremental, and it can be based on either the generation of an original invention or the adoption and adaptation of others' innovations (Damanpour and Schneider 2008). Hence, it is not the source of innovation but the local site of implementation that determines whether something is an innovation (Roberts and King 1996).

The Myth of Private Sector Superiority in Innovation

The myth that the private sector is much more innovative than the public sector is widespread. It stems from the fact that much of the generic innovation literature is "context blind," assuming the existence of firms, markets, and competition as a precondition of innovation (Hartley 2013; Lynn 1997). The centrality of markets in theories of private sector innovation has created a particular, though inaccurate, form of reasoning. Innovation enables firms to survive in competitive markets (Johnson 2008; Schumpeter 1950); public organizations do not operate in markets; ergo, the public sector lacks the ability to produce innovation. The further apparent logical consequence is to try to make the public sector more like the private sector in structure, culture, and management.

It is futile to try to assess whether there is "more" innovation in one sector or another. Measures are indirect, approximate, and incomparable across different innovation dimensions and organizations. Cross-sector comparison may also hide important subsector variation, including variation across types of services, different organizations, and across levels of government (the last, most notably, in countries such as the United States). However, a comparison of the institutional conditions for innovation in the public and private sectors is illuminating and tends to undermine the myth of private sector superiority in innovation.

The institutional conditions for private sector innovation bear examination. Markets are institutional orders based on rules, norms, and regulations that aim to encourage free competition among buyers and sellers. Competition creates a clear and undeniable incentive for firms to innovate because failure to do so will tend to eliminate them from the market. However, while market-based competition can drive innovation, it also can act as a barrier. TEECE (1992) shows that market competition tends to generate both too little and too
much innovation. There can be too little innovation because firms are unable to effectively exclude other firms from exploiting the innovations that they have developed (the “free-riding” problem). However, competition also tends to produce too much innovation because firms overinvest in the early stages of innovation to be first at the patent office but consequently deplete their exploitation opportunities and fail at the point when the serious development work begins (the “overbidding” problem).

Despite its limitations, competition clearly motivates organizations in market environments to innovate their products, production methods, and marketing techniques. However, we should not forget that many private firms operating in competitive markets are organized as bureaucracies, which is an organizational form that acts as a barrier to innovation (Burns and Stalker 1961; Halvorsen et al. 2005). Therefore, organizational entrepreneurs in private business will tend to be hampered by hierarchical decision making, risk-averse leaders, departmentalization, inflexible rules and routines, professional boundaries, and institutional seclusion. In this sense, there are similarities with many public organizations. Rainey and Chun (2005) conclude that there is mixed evidence as to whether public or private organizations are more bureaucratic, and where differences are found, they are not large. So, competition may create pressures for firms to innovate, but it does not provide a specific method for developing and implementing innovation.

Turning to the institutional conditions for public sector innovation, it appears that the myth of an inertial public sector can be problematized by examining some of the drivers of and barriers to public innovation. The barriers to innovation in the public sector have been well rehearsed, even over-rehearsed (Halvorsen et al. 2005). Public organizations have no clear financial bottom line to use in measuring the value of innovation, and the public value of innovations is hard to assess. Public organizations and partnerships often lack financial incentives to innovate and are rarely allowed to keep the cost savings from innovations. Public organizations develop innovations in the presumption of openness and transparency and often with contested goals and outcomes, magnified by media interest, which has enhanced the view that public organizations are risk averse in their innovation decisions (Brown and Osborne 2013). Finally, public organizations are governed by politicians who have to take account of multiple stakeholders in innovation while knowing that innovation failure may be exploited by the political opposition.

Arguably, however, the barriers to public sector innovation have been overplayed, mainly from a private sector perspective, while the drivers are underacknowledged. Despite recent attempts to create public quasi markets, market-based competition still carries limited weight as a motivating factor, and there are other drivers of innovation. Some lie in the organization and some in its institutional context. Koch and Hauknes (2005) note that people in both public and private sectors may be motivated by a range of reasons beyond profit, including problem solving; the propagation of a policy, idea, or rationality; the desire for growth; and reputation (both personal and organizational). Others perceive the attempt to improve performance and address gaps between needs and aspirations of different publics, on the one hand, and actual service provision, on the other, as important drivers (e.g., Albury 2005). In some cases, the drive to innovate comes from public employees with professional training who seek to advance their professional values and aspirations, for example, by inventing new methods for treating patients or teaching children to read and write. Nevertheless, the presence of strong professions in the public sector may also act as a barrier to innovation (Ferlie et al. 2005). The motivation for innovation in the public sector comes not only from managers and staff within the organization (Borins 1998) but also from elected and appointed politicians, who wish to change society (Hartley 2005; Polsby 1984). Citizens and civic groups, as well as users of public services cast in the role of “customers,” can also trigger public innovation by exiting or giving voice to their views and demands (Hirschman 1970; Osborne, Chew, and McLaughlin 2008) and/or by engaging in the co-creation and coproduction of public services (Alford 2009; Pestoff 2012).

When it comes to the crucial issue of size, the public sector has a clear advantage. Research shows that large organizations, contrary to common opinion, tend to be better at innovation through all stages to implementation and diffusion (Damanpour 1992; Hage and Aiken 1967). Large organizations have more resources to invest in innovation and are capable of absorbing the costs of innovation failure. This is true across sectors, and there are many more large organizations in the public sector than in the private sector. In addition, the institutional, political, and normative pressures to diffuse innovations in order to try to improve services (Bate and Robert 2003; Rashman and Hartley 2002) and public value (Benington and Moore 2011) is another driver that can be prominent in the public sector.

Overall, the comparison of the drivers and barriers in each sector shows that the two sectors are facing both some of the same, as well as some sector-specific drivers and barriers (Halvorsen et al. 2005). In both sectors, innovation can be driven by competition, although competition in the public sector in most cases is based on the desire for growth and reputation rather than market pressures. If public innovation is less motivated by market-based competition, there appear to be other sector-specific drivers, some of which tend to be more prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector. As for the barriers, both sectors confront a number of innovation barriers deriving from bureaucratic organizational form. Market competition, however, may act as a sector-specific barrier in private markets, whereas other sector-specific barriers, such as the presence of risk-averse political decision makers, tend to hamper innovation in the public sector. In sum, the myth of private sector superiority in innovation—which is based on the apparent syllogism that because the public sector is not subject to market competition, it is not innovative—appears to be completely unsustained.

The Contributions and Limits of NPM as a Viable Innovation Strategy

The recognition that both the public and private sectors have particular drivers and barriers in innovation helps reveal why NPM reforms that introduce private sector governance and management
practices into the public sector may not result in noticeable growth in public innovation (Hartley 2005; Hess and Adams 2007; Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 2001). To assume that public innovation will flourish because of the creation of quasi markets and the adoption of new forms of strategic leadership and performance management overlooks the fact that the private sector is also prey to innovation barriers. However, this argument does not mean that enhanced competition in quasi markets and the adoption of new management practices have not contributed at all to public innovation. NPM has helped spur public innovation in some areas (Lubienski 2009; Parker, Ryan, and Brown 2000), but there has been insufficient reflection on the innovation barriers associated with competition and managerialism. In order to develop a more nuanced view of the impact of NPM on public innovation, we first look at the positive effects of NPM and then discuss some of the barriers.

NPM reforms have contributed to enhancing public sector innovation in at least two ways. First, NPM has enhanced the competition for public service contracts among public, private, and nonprofit providers. While sometimes spurring a “race to the bottom,” this marketization strategy has forced both public and private service providers to “do more with less” and even sometimes to innovate the form, content, and delivery of public services in order to win contracts and ensure contract renewal (Sørensen 2012). Because service providers are competing not only for contracts but also for citizens now cast in the role as consumers (e.g., users of public services with exit options), public service organizations have become more demand driven in some service areas, and this has spurred user-driven innovation (Jæger 2013). Service providers aim to attract as many users of public services as possible where they are financed by direct payments from service users, by government vouchers, or by payment by results.

Second, NPM has enhanced public innovation by influencing the management culture in the public sector. The traditional bureaucratic emphasis on legal regulation through lawmaking and rule following has been supplemented by a new emphasis on strategic management that focuses on performance and results (Bryson, Berry, and Yang 2010). Here, the role of senior managers is to support elected politicians in formulating the overall goals and targets and in defining the legal, economic, and discursive framework for public regulation and service production. Ideally, operational managers in devolved agencies deploy rules, resources, and employees flexibly and efficiently in order to achieve predefined goals and targets and provide high-quality services in an efficient manner. This system of “regulated self-regulation” (Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009) tends, at least in theory, to create more room for local experimentation and service development than traditional forms of bureaucratic service production. However, in practice, the room for local self-regulation is limited by the development of an elaborate and rather bureaucratic system of performance management based on large numbers of measures, targets, indicators, and benchmarks, which creates gaming behaviors, distorting superordinate goals (e.g., Andrews et al. 2008; Hood 2006). On the other hand, the systematic monitoring of results enables local managers to identify inefficiencies, performance gaps, and new opportunities that are sometimes addressed through innovation (Walker, Damapour, and Devece 2011), although frequently, public managers are content with pursuing rationalization through Lean techniques that neither produce innovation nor user value (Radnor and Osborne 2013). Hence, few commentators on performance management have linked it empirically to the generation, implementation, and diffusion of innovation despite the salience of innovation in NPM discourse.

Although NPM has spurred some public innovation, the gains have been accompanied by some clear drawbacks, as NPM unintentionally has introduced some serious barriers to innovation. Competition, which in the public sector has taken the form of government-controlled quasi markets, is a double-edged sword. While it may drive innovation, it can also discourage service providers from sharing knowledge and engaging in interorganizational learning, both of which, along with trust, are central to developing innovative solutions to joint problems (Rashman, Withers, and Hartley 2009; Teece 1992).

Moreover, NPM has introduced a number of barriers to innovation that are similar to those found in traditional public administration. First, the unrelenting focus on performance often accelerates the production of the kind of detailed bureaucratic rules that NPM was meant to eliminate. The creation of new rules is often the standard response of elected politicians and executive administrative leaders to cases of severe underperformance of public services publicized in the mass media. The concern with risk in public service production also encourages middle managers to extend and develop rules in order to maintain standards and avoid risk (Brown and Osborne 2013). The incessant proliferation of rules keeps public employees in a straitjacket, which inhibits innovation.

Second, accountability through managerial control is a key characteristic of NPM and is increasingly obtained through a self-accelerating system of performance measurement that aims to eliminate opportunistic behavior (Power 1997). The measurement of particular processes and output targets tends to hamper innovation because innovative solutions may produce different kinds of outputs through entirely new processes that may not initially have measurement data. The measurement of particular processes and output targets tends to hamper innovation because innovative solutions may produce different kinds of outputs through entirely new processes that may not initially have measurement data.

Finally, the fundamental problem of NPM is its inherent tendency to give priority to the enhancement of efficiency in the production
of standardized services over the enhancement of effectiveness of public policies and service systems. “Lean” is an example of an incremental methodology to achieve efficiencies in public service delivery. Although Lean methodology is not entirely suited to public services, in part because it does not sufficiently take account of the integrated service systems that can span several organizations along with service users (Osborne, Radnor, and Nasi 2013; Radnor and Osborne 2013), it is widely used in the public sector. The problem, at least from an innovation perspective, is that Lean is primarily a tool for rationalizing work processes in relation to pre-defined service and does not attempt to produce innovative services or create entirely new service systems by reframing problems or goals.

Overall, this institutional and organizational analysis shows that NPM has a number of features that can spur public innovation, but also that the positive impact of NPM on innovation is undermined by some unintended consequences of competition, performance management, the focus on efficiency more than effectiveness, and the focus on single services and organizations rather than service systems.

**Public Innovation in Neo-Weberian Bureaucracies**

NPM has many supporters among public choice theorists, but there is also a growing number of critics (Christensen and Lægøe 2007; Ferlie et al. 1996). The main critique is NPM’s focus on the marketization of the public sector, which tends to overlook fundamental differences between public and private sectors. So, it is tempting to opt for a return to traditional forms of public bureaucracy (Du Gay 2000) or perhaps to develop a modified version of public administration that unifies traditional virtues of Weberian bureaucracy with certain elements of NPM while also adding new elements. To this end, a group of public administration scholars has started to talk about the “neo-Weberian state” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). There is no coherent or comprehensive doctrine delineating the precise content of the neo-Weberian state (Lynn 2008), but some central features of this institutional form have been sketched. It is a form claimed to be more capable of enhancing innovation than either traditional public administration or NPM (Drechsler and Kattell 2008–09).

A key to understanding the innovation potential of the neo-Weberian state is the implicit emphasis on the organizational entrepreneurship of public leaders, managers, and professionals. Entrepreneurship is promoted by a variety of public sector reforms, such as further strengthening transformational, post-transformational, and distributive leadership. Whereas transformational leadership strengthens strategic responsibility for creating substantial organizational change (including innovation) (Bass and Riggio 2006), post-transformational and distributive leadership strategies encourage senior leaders to share the responsibility for leading and driving change with frontline managers and employees (Parry and Bryman 2006; Spillane 2005). Another set of reforms aims to strengthen the coordination between public agencies enhancing intraorganizational and interorganizational integration, both vertically and horizontally, thus countering the problems generated by arm’s-length governance (Christensen and Lægøe 2010). A third set of reforms seeks to replace the control-based systems of performance management with a more trust-based system that simplifies formal rules and performance measures and encourages trust and engagement with staff so that they apply their professional knowledge and skills to innovations that create public value (Nyhan 2000). A fourth set of reforms aims to make the public sector more responsive to users’ and citizens’ demands and aspirations (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Organizational entrepreneurs can use different techniques, including digital ones, to discover the acknowledged and unacknowledged needs of citizens. The list could be continued, but the argument is clear: a neo-Weberian public sector can support and sustain organizational entrepreneurship that enhances innovation.

The strategy of innovation in a neo-Weberian state provides a promising alternative to NPM that addresses some of the weaknesses of the latter. However, while it is more outwardly focused, with its interest in citizens, than NPM, both view innovation as predominantly an “in-house” activity. Whereas NPM celebrates public and private contractors operating within quasi markets as the true innovation heroes, the neo-Weberian state praises the organizational entrepreneurship of public leaders, managers, and employees operating within public organizations as the primary source of innovation. Both of these innovation strategies fail to realize and mobilize the huge innovation potential that lies in extraorganizational innovation.

**Toward a Viable Collaborative Approach to Public Innovation**

There is growing evidence that collaboration can spur public innovation (Bommert 2010; Eggers and Singh 2009; Roberts and King 1996). Theories of collaborative innovation in the public sector derive both from theories of network governance, which emphasize the role of collaborative networks in finding innovative solutions to complex problems (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996), and from theories of learning that conceptualize step change as occurring through interorganizational interaction and collaborative processes (Engeström 2008; Lave and Wenger 1991). Theories of collaborative innovation also echo insights from management theories about private sector innovation, where it focuses on “social innovation” (Phillips, Diegelmeier, and Miller 2008), “co-creation” (Prhalad and Ramaswamy 2004), and “open innovation” (Chesbrough 2003).

Innovation is most often a result of interaction between actors from different levels and organizations. A meta-analysis of scientific studies of public and private innovation reveals that internal and external communication and collaboration have positive effects on innovation (Damanpour 1991). Analysis of the U.S. public innovations submitted to a national award program showed that 60 percent were created through interorganizational collaboration (Borins 2001). Finally, national surveys and case studies from the United Kingdom demonstrate that local authorities with greater collaboration within and across organizations and in peer networks are more innovative than those without (Downe, Hartley, and Rashman 2004; Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 2001).

The empirical evidence is supported by arguments about how collaboration can strengthen all stages of innovation (Eggers and Singh 2009; Sørensen and Tørfing 2011). The definition and framing of
complex problems is often improved when actors with different experiences and perspectives and forms of knowledge are brought together. The generation of new and creative solutions is enhanced when different ideas are developed, combined, challenged, and built on. The selection, prototyping, and testing of promising ideas is strengthened when diverse actors help assess gains and risks. Implementation of new and bold solutions can be improved when different resources are mobilized, exchanged, and coordinated and joint ownership is created through participation and dialogue. Last but not least, innovative solutions are diffused when collaborators become external ambassadors for the new ideas and practices. In sum, collaboration can open up innovation processes for the active participation of a broad range of actors with different innovation assets (Bommert 2010).

Recognizing collaboration as a potential driver of public (and private) innovation involves understanding what collaboration entails. A clear definition of collaboration is important because it is often wrongly associated with the creation of unanimous consent (Straus 2002). This is unrealistic in terms of how collaboration functions in practice. Instead, we define collaboration here as the process through which two or more actors engage in a constructive management of differences in order to define common problems and develop joint solutions based on provisional agreements that may coexist with disagreement and dissent (Gray 1989). This definition permits us to appreciate the productive role of difference and conflict in creative processes (Thomas 1992), including in innovation.

Interestingly, the collaborative approach to innovation is used not only in the public sector but also increasingly in the private sector (Tidd and Bessant 2009). Networks and partnerships between competing clusters of firms provide an important driver of innovation in high-tech industries (Powell and Grodal 2004). Associations and networks of civil society organizations can also produce innovative projects and events through interorganizational innovation (Sørensen and Torfing 2003). Collaboration is not only becoming a key innovation strategy within each sector, but also it occurs across sectors, bringing together public authorities, private firms, civil society organizations, as well as groups and individuals (Moore and Hartley 2008; Sørensen and Torfing 2011).

The institutional design of collaborative innovation in the public sector may vary in accordance with the problem at hand and the range of actors involved (Eggers and Singh 2009). A tentative typology of institutional designs, inspired by Eggers and Singh (2009), includes the following:

- Intraorganizational skunkworks projects that allow talented and engaged public servants with different professional backgrounds to collaborate with each other, and perhaps also with lead users, in order to develop and test new ideas
- Interorganizational networks between public managers or professionals, perhaps with the participation of scientific experts, that facilitate identification, diffusion, adaption, and exploitation of other organizations’ most successful innovations
- Governance networks that bring together the relevant and affected actors from different levels and sectors in order to find innovative solutions to joint problems
- Public–private innovation partnerships that aim to exploit resource complementarities between public authorities and private firms to generate innovative solutions and test them in an organizational environment that is not burdened by the restrictive rules and norms normally found in the public sector
- Crowdsourcing that uses open calls on the Internet to recruit and collaborate with a large group of anonymous actors who think they can contribute relevant ideas and resources to processes of innovative problem solving

While the collaborative approach to public innovation has a lot of potential benefits, there are also constraints and limits. Hence, there are areas and situations in which collaborative innovation is neither feasible nor desirable. First, not all situations are amenable to collaborative involvement from a range of actors. One example would be where there is a political preference for confidentiality and seclusion (Torfing et al. 2012). If public authorities fear that collaboration may compromise public security, compromise the privacy of private firms and citizens, or harm the interests of public enterprises, collaborative innovation could be damaging.

Second, collaborative innovation might also be difficult in geographic regions or policy areas with deep-seated ideological, religious, or ethnic conflicts (Gray 1989). For example, with highly controversial social issues, it may not work to bring supporters and opponents together in collaborative efforts to find innovative solutions (although advanced tools for conflict mediation may sometimes succeed in getting adversaries to engage in respectful dialogue).

Third, collaboration may be hampered in situations in which there are large imbalances in the power resources of the key stakeholders (Gray 1989). If the stronger actors believe that they can solve the problem on their own, win an antagonistic dispute, or dictate the premises for finding a joint solution, this will tend to prevent or distort dialogue and collaboration.

Finally, collaborative innovation may be at risk when particular private actors are able to capture the collaborative arena and exploit the process of innovation and its result to their own advantage. This highlights the difference between private organizations that are primarily geared toward producing private value and public organizations whose primary purpose is to produce public value (Benington and Moore 2011; Moore 1995).

Summing up, the analysis suggests that although collaborative innovation carries an unrealized potential for creating new public policies and service, it is not an institutional strategy that works in all contexts.

The analysis suggests that although collaborative innovation carries an unrealized potential for creating new public policies and service, it is not an institutional strategy that works in all contexts.

Leading and Managing Collaborative Innovation

Despite the exceptions mentioned earlier, there is wide scope for applying a collaborative innovation strategy to public problems, especially in areas such as planning, urban regeneration, environmental protection, economic development, employment policy, and
service improvement in education, health care, and social assistance. However, even in these areas, there might still be barriers to collaborative innovation that can be removed, or at least mitigated, through the exercise of appropriate leadership and management (Ansell and Gash 2012; Sørensen and Torfing 2012). In these complex processes of collaborative innovation, many things can go wrong between intention and execution.

First, bringing together the relevant and affected actors in sustained interaction might fail because there is no history or tradition of interaction, because the experiences with interaction are negative, or because it is difficult to motivate the relevant actors to spend time and energy on interactive participation (Ansell and Gash 2008; Gray 1989).

Second, when actors choose to interact, it is often because they recognize the need to exchange or pool ideas and resources in order to address urgent and/or significant problems, but interaction does not always foster collaboration, as conflicts of interest might prevail. In addition, collaboration may be prevented by the prevalence of mistrust and opportunistic behavior, the presence of procedural uncertainty, or the existence of incompatible cognitive and discursive frameworks (Ansell and Gash 2008; Gray 1989; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Straus 2002).

Third, even when actors engage in collaborative processes, these may not foster innovation. Repeated collaboration in closed and stable networks consisting of the “usual suspects” who, over time, have developed more or less the same worldviews will tend to stifle creativity and prevent the generation of new and bold ideas, their prototyping, and implementation and reduce the diffusion of innovation (Skilton and Dooley 2010). In addition, a heightened level of strategic uncertainty and incomplete institutionalization of collaborative arenas may also prevent effective implementation (O’Toole 1997). Finally, the failure to bridge structural holes in the networks of communication may hamper the diffusion of innovation (Burt 1992).

In sum, there is a constant danger that different barriers will disrupt the links between interaction, collaboration, and innovation. Certainly, good intentions to come together to collaborate and to explore and exploit new and bold ideas are not enough to ensure collaborative innovation in the public sphere. In order to sustain the process of collaborative innovation, certain kinds of leadership and management are required.

Such leadership and management will have to orchestrate various activities to try to overcome the different barriers to interaction, collaboration, and innovation (Ansell and Gash 2012). First, in order to create well-functioning interactive arenas with active and committed actors, innovation leaders and managers must act as conveners (see Newman 2011). The convener aims to motivate, empower, and bring together the actors, create and frame the interactive arena, set the agenda, clarify the interactive processes, and promote a mutual adjustment of expectations (Ansell and Gash 2008; Page 2010).

Second, public leaders and managers can encourage and facilitate collaboration between stakeholders by acting as mediators. The mediator aims to create or clarify interdependencies; manage the process by dividing it into different phases; and build trust and resolve disputes by aligning interests, constructing common frameworks, and removing barriers to collaboration (Crosby and Bryson 2010; Straus 2002).

Finally, the advancement of collaborative innovation can be promoted by a catalyst that exercises a form of entrepreneurial leadership and management. The catalyst encourages a reframing of problems, brings new knowledge and actors into play, explores existing and emerging constraints and opportunities, manages risks, and encourages transformative learning and “out-of-the-box” thinking (Crosby and Bryson 2010).

Leadership and management of processes of collaborative innovation can be provided either by trained facilitators or by organic leaders (e.g., politicians, public managers) who are connected to, or familiar with, the stakeholders in the interactive arenas (Gray 1989). Centrality, legitimacy, access to resources, and organizational backup are the fundamental institutional conditions for collaborative innovation orchestrators, who also must possess an array of personal competencies such as reflexivity, imagination and vision, flexibility, open-mindedness, and boundary-spanning and communicative skills.

Even when barriers to collaborative public innovation are properly addressed through skillful leadership and management, some key challenges remain. One is that fiscal crisis will tend to strengthen the demands for secure administration and fail-safe service production. Such demands strengthen risk aversion and reduce the prospects for innovation. On the other hand, the pressure to save money and make cuts while maintaining services may force politicians and public managers to seek out innovation (Pollitt 2010).

Another crucial barrier for collaborative innovation is that it requires a reformulation of the traditional roles of public and private actors. Elected politicians will have to relinquish ideas of being political sovereigns who have all the power and responsibility and will need to redefine their political leadership role as setting the agenda, convening relevant and affected actors, and defining many aspects of these policies and services through dialogue and negotiation with a plethora of actors, even though they retain formal powers to pass laws and decide policies and budgets. Public managers will have to relinquish technocratic perceptions that only they have the professional expertise to make sound decisions, seeing themselves instead as meta-governors who are orchestrating collaborative arenas that harvest ideas and practices from a range of innovators. Private firms and voluntary organizations will have to reframe their role perception from that of competitors, lobbyists, and advocates for particular interests and groups to become responsible partners in the production of innovative solutions for public value. Finally, citizens will have to shift their identities to encompass their contributions as co-creators and coproducers rather than solely as clients, customers, or regulatees. Role perceptions are notoriously difficult to change, but the lack of public resources and the growing number of policy deadlocks may be conducive to these new roles.
**Discussion and Conclusion**

Public innovation that aims to foster disruptive step changes is not an all-purpose instrument that can solve all of the current challenges in the public sector. Continuous service improvements, integrated planning processes, and strategic reallocation of public resources are also needed to deal with the changing demands of citizens and service users. However, the enhancement of public innovation is important in order to avoid responding to the fiscal crisis either by blind “across-the-board” cuts that make program specialists responsible for more or less self-interested choices about cutting expenditures or by “strategic prioritization of spending cuts” that makes politicians responsible for painful choices (Pollitt 2010). In addition to this defensive reason for public innovation as a means of “doing more with less,” there are also proactive reasons for boosting innovation: increasing the capacity of organizations and groups to address the growing number of wicked problems and realizing political goals for the future development of society.

This article has aimed to explain why the attempt of the public sector to learn from and imitate the private sector’s approach to innovation through the adoption of NPM reforms that emphasize market competition and strategic management has not led to a significant increase in policy and service innovation, as had been expected by exponents of NPM. The article has challenged the context blindness of the innovation literature and created a more a nuanced understanding of the drivers and barriers to innovation in the public and private sector that emphasizes differences but also similarities.

However, NPM critics have suggested that instead of returning to traditional forms of public administration, which can create innovation but often blunt innovative intent and motivation (Hartley 2005), we should instead aim to foster a new kind of organizational entrepreneurship predicated on a distributive and trust-based leadership, institutional integration, and more and better information about, and interest in, users. This neo-Weberian state has some clear advantages to traditional public administration, and it also remedies some of the problems in the innovation strategy recommended by NPM. However, both strategies suggest that public innovation is created and implemented inside particular organizations, whether private firms or public organizations. Both strategies are inwardly focused and thus fail to reap the fruits of interorganizational, multilevel, and cross-sector collaboration, which can be important for certain types of innovation.

Collaborative innovation aims to transcend the false choice between innovation being driven either by organizational entrepreneurs or by private service providers in artificially created quasi markets. Collaborative innovation brings together a range of stakeholders from the public, for-profit, and nonprofit sectors, as well as users and citizens themselves, in interactive arenas that facilitate the cross-fertilization of ideas, mutual and transformative learning, and the development of joint ownership of new solutions. However, as analyzed here, collaborative innovation is no panacea, as a number of obstacles can impede the process of collaborative innovation at different stages.

A comparison of the three innovation strategies suggests that the collaborative approach has a major advantage vis-à-vis the two other strategies. Not only does it facilitate innovative processes that cut across institutional and organizational borders, but also it has a conceptualization of how innovations are actually produced. Increasingly, innovation studies across all sectors are theorizing and empirically studying the role of a variety of actors in innovation processes, on a continuum from “lead users” (Von Hippel 2005) to strategic alliances (Tidd and Bessant 2009) to open innovation (Chesbrough 2003). It is perhaps here that we find the real strength of the collaborative strategy, although it is still in its infancy.

Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe in “one best way” to enhance public innovation. All three innovation strategies have particular strengths and weaknesses, and a key task for future research will be to develop a contingency theory that specifies and explains when, where, and why each of the three strategies, or perhaps a combination of them, is beneficial. We conclude this article by offering a few reflections that may serve as a starting point for developing such a contingency theory. The NPM strategy for enhancing public innovation is suitable when the task is to spur service and organizational innovations in order to enhance efficiency rather than effectiveness, but it is contingent on public services having a low asset specificity and a high degree of standardization, as otherwise quasi markets will not work properly (Williamson 1981). The neo-Weberian innovation strategy has particular strength in relation to policy innovation and in those forms of service innovation that aim to enhance quality and match or anticipate the changing needs and aspirations of citizens. However, it is less relevant in areas in which strong professional groups oppose change, there is a need for external input in terms of new ideas or special resources, or the creation of joint ownership or implementation is necessary, which is where collaborative innovation may have value. Collaborative innovation strategy can enhance both policy and service innovation, although service innovation will not tend to increase efficiency and reduce costs unless the private actors are shouldering some of the fiscal burden or engaging in coproduced service provision. But, as noted, there are some situations in which the collaborative strategy is not suitable, and to the existing list of exemptions, we might add a more general concern. Collaboration takes time and has high transaction costs, so where there are time and resource constraints, then other innovation strategies will be more attractive and effective.

These considerations of contingencies in relation to three innovation strategies (and their combination) take the focus beyond solely efficiencies in innovation processes toward thinking about the viability and appropriateness of particular innovation strategies. This involves considering the purposes of innovation; the quality, dynamism, and interconnectedness of the services; the organizational forms that foster or inhibit innovation; the ownership and engagement by stakeholders in the implementation of innovation, not just its initiation; the power balances and imbalances among stakeholders; and the creation of public value.

**References**


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