ELECTORAL GENDER QUOTAS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADITIONAL LEADERS:
A POLICY EXPERIMENT IN LESOTHO

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Abstract

The adoption of electoral gender quotas has increased dramatically in the last 20 years, receiving praise for transforming the composition of political bodies worldwide. Gender quotas, however, have also been criticized as an unsuccessful tool in challenging the de facto power of traditional patriarchal elites. The case of Lesotho provides a randomized policy experiment to test for changes in the influence of traditional leaders after quota adoption at the subnational level. Between 2005 and 2011, Lesotho reserved at random 30 percent of all newly formed single-member local electoral divisions for only female candidates. Using a unique data set by merging the 2008 Afro-barometer survey with the reservation status of respondents’ villages, I find that having a quota-mandated female leader significantly reduces the perceived influence of traditional leaders. Further, I find that this treatment effect holds across different demographic groups, suggesting a widespread policy impact. © 2014 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, more than 100 countries have implemented some type of quota for women in their domestic political structures, leading to one of the most significant developments in the global composition of legislative bodies in the last 20 years. These quotas have emerged in every region of the world, often in surprising places, with transformative results for the number of women in politics. Rwanda, for instance, which reserves seats in both its upper and lower houses for women, has received international praise for superseding Sweden as first in the world in women’s parliamentary representation, with 64 percent of its total seats held by women against Sweden’s 45 percent. Gender quotas have also expanded rapidly at the subnational level, allowing more women access to local political decisionmaking than ever before.

Political science research examining the origins and impacts of gender quota adoption has also expanded rapidly. A healthy research agenda has emerged that examines the diffusion of quota policies and the effectiveness of quotas in increasing the number of women in politics (Bush, 2011; Dahlerup, 2006; Jones, 2009; Krook, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Tripp & Kang, 2008). A second wave of quota scholarship in recent years examines the potential impacts of quota adoption, including how quotas affect the substantive representation of women’s interests in political bodies as well as how quotas affect public attitudes and behavior toward female leaders (see Franceschet, Krook, & Piscopo, 2012). One less systematically addressed dimension of the quota literature examines the ability of quota recipients to translate their presence in decisionmaking bodies into political influence.
Despite its unsystematic treatment, a great number of case studies have suggested that women's presence in political bodies has not usurped the de facto power of traditional male elites. This occurrence is perhaps most likely at the level of local governance. Particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the historical importance of patrilineal chiefs in structuring community life suggests that male-dominated power structures may be most entrenched at the village level in comparison to more recently formed national legislatures.

This paper examines how the institution of gender quotas interacts with the power base of local traditional leaders by taking advantage of a policy experiment with reserved local electoral divisions (EDs) for female community councilors in Lesotho. The results presented here indicate that the perceived influence of traditional leaders is significantly dampened in EDs reserved for women, suggesting that quotas have allowed women not only de jure but de facto leadership roles in these communities. I offer hypotheses about the mediating factors that may be causing this effect, but the lack of heterogeneous treatment effects within different demographic subgroups suggests that multiple mediators are likely at play.

This paper is organized as follows: The first section presents the case of Lesotho as a randomized policy experiment to test the ways quota-mandated female leadership affects the perceived influence of traditional elites. I then review the relevant literature examining how quotas for women in local politics might interact with traditional power structures in newly decentralized contexts. The next section outlines the theoretical framework of this study to understand the possible strategic and gendered interactions between traditional authorities and local councilors. The following section introduces the data and methods used to measure the impact of the quota law. The Results section presents the model results and robustness considerations. It also assesses the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects in areas where chiefs had previously high or low levels of influence prior to the quota. The following section offers a discussion of the findings in relation to the theoretical framework and the final section concludes.¹

CASE SELECTION: A POLICY EXPERIMENT IN LESOTHO

This study takes advantage of a nationwide randomized policy experiment in the southern African nation of Lesotho. In 2005, similar to other African nations at the time and in part guided by international organizations and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Lesotho began a protracted process of decentralization. At this time, the Ministry of Local Government divided the country's 10 main local administrative districts into 129 newly created community councils. Each community council was divided into nine to 13 single-member EDs, each of which elects a community councilor through a first-past-the-post election. The community councilors elected from each ED are mandated to represent the villages in their district at community council meetings, which typically meet once a month. The EDs are relatively small, with constituencies consisting on average of around 600 adults over the age of 18. Before each council meeting, each councilor customarily has a separate meeting (pitso) with residents from the villages in his/her ED in order to better represent his/her constituents in the community council.²

¹ This project is one of several, which I am currently conducting, that examines the effect of the quota law on a host of outcome variables, including political attitudes and behavior and citizen bias against female leaders. See, for instance, Clayton (forthcoming) on the effect of the quota on female citizens' political engagement in reserved EDs.
² The community councilors elected from each ED are mandated to represent the villages in their district at community council meetings, which typically meet once a month. The EDs are relatively small, with constituencies consisting on average of around 600 adults over the age of 18. Before each council meeting, each councilor customarily has a separate meeting (pitso) with residents from the villages in his/her ED in order to better represent his/her constituents in the community council.
The experimental nature of the quota is as follows: Between 2005 and 2011, the Local Government Elections Act required that 30 percent of all newly created single-member EDs (distributed across the newly created councils) be reserved for only female councilors. Women still competed with other women in these EDs, but men were not allowed to compete. Importantly, the all-women constituencies were assigned completely at random (SADC, 2011, p. 59). Therefore, between April 2005 and October 2011, electoral law required that Basotho citizens in 30 percent of all local EDs be exposed to quota-mandated women as political leaders, whereas the remaining 70 percent of EDs had open arenas of contestation. It should be noted, however, that despite the 30 percent legal requirement, in actuality only 29.1 percent of EDs were selected for reservation. Importantly, women also won in EDs that were not reserved by the quota. In total during this period, quota-mandated women held 29.1 percent of community councilor positions, non-quota-mandated women held 26.3 percent, and men held 44.6 percent. Below I present various tests for true random assignment as stipulated by the quota law, including balance diagnostics on observable characteristics between future reserved and unreserved EDs prior to quota adoption.

Lesotho’s randomized policy experiment has several advantages. First, cross-national comparisons do not address the possibility that countries that adopt quotas are also more likely to be otherwise evolving toward more inclusive governance structures. These countries may simultaneously contain a citizenry with changing views about the appropriateness and capabilities of women in the political sphere that challenge the primacy placed on male-dominated traditional authorities. The use of time-series data also does not ameliorate this problem, the key concern being that countries that adopt quotas may be doing so as a response to an ongoing nationwide change in attitudes toward appropriate gender roles. In such instances, correlations between quota-induced increases in female leadership and changes in attitudes toward traditional authorities may not reflect the causal impact of quotas. The random allocation of reserved single-member EDs in one national setting, however, implies that a difference in citizens’ perceptions between reserved and unreserved EDs captures the causal effect of having experienced a quota-mandated female leader.

Traditional Leaders in Lesotho

As in most African countries (Lund, 2006), the chieftaincy has historically been interconnected with the governance structures of Lesotho. By law, Lesotho’s upper parliamentary house is composed of 24 high-level chiefs and nine nonchiefs appointed by the King. Lesotho’s King (a direct descendant of King Moshoeshoe I, Lesotho’s founding Paramount Chief) also serves as the current Paramount Chief of

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3 Reservation status was randomly assigned by selecting every third ED (or at times every fourth ED) from the complete list. From a series of expert interviews in country, there were no reports that the assigning and thus ordering of ED numbers was preconceived with the quota assignment in mind. The balance diagnostics presented below indicate that reservation can indeed be assumed random. Tangential to this study, in 2011 the Local Government Elections Act was amended to replace the women-only single-member districts with a different type of quota system that now allows open contestation in all EDs. The new system sets aside a separate number of additional seats on each council for women. The electoral law now stipulates an additional ballot in each of the EDs run on a proportional representation system in which voters choose a party that supplies an all-women list. The vote share that each party receives corresponds to the number of women on their list who join the council.

4 Basotho is Lesotho’s predominant ethnic group and is a term that has become synonymous with Lesotho’s nationality. The term “Sesotho” refers both to the language of the Basotho people as well as their culture and customs.
Lesotho. There are also over 1,000 lesser chiefs, who have traditionally served as the main form of governance at the village level (Quinlan & Wallis, 2003, p. 148). Indeed in the first round of the Afro-barometer Lesotho survey, over 99 percent of respondents reported having a traditional leader, chief, or headman (Logan, 2009, p. 109).

The chieftaincy’s role in structuring local governance in Lesotho predates colonial control, but the British were the first to put the authority of chiefs into writing as a way to formalize customary law. Among other things, the written code requires that chiefly lineage be patrilineal. This tradition was recently upheld by the Lesotho High Court, which ruled that the sole daughter of a deceased Paramount Chief could not inherit his title. Patrilineal heritage, however, is not as strictly observed among lesser chiefs, and a limited number of female village-level chiefs exist, although they have less standing than their male counterparts by customary law (Petlane & Mapetla, 1998, p. 250). Lesotho then by many accounts is similar to other southern African experiences with traditional authorities (Beall, 2004; Beall et al., 2005; Molutsi, 2004) that are largely structured around patriarchal authority, which tends to limit the leadership roles of women.

The chieftaincy serves myriad functions in structuring Sesotho rural life. Chiefs have *de facto* authority over land allocation, communal grazing control, burial grounds, and the maintenance of minor roads. They also serve as the primary source of conflict resolution, both in major disputes, for instance over livestock and land, as well as more mundane policing and judicial functions, including arbitrating family disputes (Quinlan & Wallis, 2003, p. 170). In the lead up to the devolution of local authority to community councilors in 2005, the proposed division of responsibilities between the two groups was not clearly defined, causing one observer to note: “People are not yet very clear on the distinction between the functions of the proposed Community Councils versus those of the chief” (Shale, 2005, p. 4). In council focus groups conducted in the country two years after the quota’s adoption, participants reported that the opaque delegation of responsibilities had caused tensions between the two groups, as Morna and Tolmay (2007, p. 117) note:

One councilor commented: ‘working with the chiefs is very difficult because there is a lack of understanding about the roles and responsibilities of both the chiefs and councilors’ . . . [Council focus group] participants complained that at best there is a lack of support and at worst obstruction by chiefs. Complaints included the fact that chiefs continue to levy charges on the community and in some cases intentionally misallocate land belonging to community members to sabotage councilors.

In short, decentralization in Lesotho has created a new local governance system that is rife with power-sharing tensions between selected traditional leaders and elected councilors.

**SUBNATIONAL GENDER QUOTAS, DECENTRALIZATION, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS**

For the most part, the gender quota literature and the literature on decentralization and traditional influence have not met. Both these literatures, however, add insight to possible power dynamics between newly implemented gender quotas and the entrenched influence of traditional elites in structuring local governance.

The gender quota literature concerning the extent to which the *de jure* power of quota recipients has translated into *de facto* power has for the most part examined parliamentary politics (see Bauer [2012] for a review on African experiences). With a few notable exceptions, quotas that reserve parliamentary seats for women are often criticized for creating an additional vote bank for ruling parties without allowing quota recipients actual decisionmaking authority (see, for instance, Panday [2008] on Bangladesh, Meena [2004] on Tanzania, & Longman [2006] on Rwanda). In these cases, a reserved-seat system, including those with special districts for women, can...
leave quota recipients not only in practice but also in the public perception as lesser politicians.

In large part because of a lack of data, there has been less research on gender quotas at the local level, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. What research there has been often mirrors the lessons from parliamentary politics in relation to reserved-seat systems. For instance, Kawamara-Mishambi and Ovonji-Odida (2003) document local quota provisions in Uganda in which new seats for women have been added onto local councils to avoid a situation where women might unseat male councilors. The authors argue that in districts where women have been detached from normal arenas of competition, they are often treated as lesser politicians. Lesotho’s subnational quota system, however, provides a unique case in which reserved EDs do unseat potential male councilors thereby offering a test of the effects of female leadership in an instance in which they are not redundant to their male equivalents.

The most developed work on quotas in subnational governments has come from India, specifically because the Indian local-level quota design allows for causal analysis. Similar to Lesotho’s subnational quota, India has reserved one-third of leader positions in local-level single-member districts for women since 1993, and has rotated these districts at random in each election cycle. Driven primarily by economists, a great deal of research has emerged demonstrating largely positive female leadership effects. There is evidence that female leaders have different policy preferences than male leaders (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004), that female citizens participate more in village meetings under female leadership (Beaman et al., 2010; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2003; Deininger, Jin, & Nagarajan, 2011), that female candidates are more likely to run and win in reserved districts after quotas have been removed (Bhavnani, 2009), that citizens in reserved districts have less bias against female leaders (Beaman et al., 2009), and that female leaders may act as role models for young girls in their communities (Beaman et al., 2012). The female leadership effect on traditional influence in reserved districts, however, has yet to be systematically addressed in the Indian case, although some anecdotal evidence suggests that informal governance structures have a great deal of influence in selecting which women run (often uncontested) in reserved districts (Pur, 2002, p. 4285).

A second relevant literature relates to the ways decentralization has affected the influence of traditional elites as a source of local public authority. Theory-building work on the role of the chieftaincy in newly emerging African democracies notes the challenges faced when new political actors are introduced onto existing political, economic, and social systems (see Williams [2004] & Murray [2004] on South Africa; Englebert [2002] on Uganda; de Sousa Santos [2006] on Mozambique; and Muriaas [2011] on Uganda, Malawi, & South Africa). The results here are mixed and demonstrate that these new power-sharing dynamics are not always deleterious for democratic outcomes. For instance, using Afro-barometer data from 15 countries on the continent, Logan (2009) notes that respondents’ evaluations of newly decentralized local authorities and hereditary chiefs are positively linked, indicating that rather than being a zero-sum game over control of local power and resources, “Local traditional leaders appear to draw their sustenance and legitimacy from the same well as elected officials” (Logan, 2008, p. iii).

A related literature examines whether the type of relationship that exists between local politicians and traditional leaders affects the local provision of public goods. Documenting these empirical effects, however, proves difficult in large part because of the difficulties associated with measuring the influence of traditional leaders or other types of unelected patrons in local politics. In theory, closer relationships between local councilors and chiefs could indicate that councilors are benefitting from chiefs’ clientelistic networks to buy votes and ensure future electoral support. In such instances, patronage-based redistribution may come at the expense of public goods provision (Bratton, 2008; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Keefer, 2005; van de
Walle, 2003, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003). Baldwin (2013), however, finds that closer ties between chiefs and local MPs in single-member constituencies in Zambia are beneficial to the public provision of education because chiefs “serve as a technology by which resources are delivered to communities” and further that citizens vote for MPs backed by local chiefs because they recognize these welfare benefits.

Although fiscal responsibilities have not been devolved to community councils in Lesotho to the same extent as in other recently decentralized countries, there is anecdotal evidence that conflictual relationships between chiefs and councilors are likely detrimental to local service delivery—and further that the propensity for these types of conflicts are gendered. For instance, Morna and Tolmay (2007, p. 118), who provide the only interview and focus group-based account of local government in Lesotho during this time, relate the experience of one female councilor:

She [a female councilor] alleges that she faces resistance from some of the men who work closely with the chiefs. The biggest problem she has faced as a councilor is the poor turn out at *pitosos* (public gatherings), that she has organized through the chief whom she relies on to send out invitations. She is convinced that the chief is not sending the invitations out in time. It is at these meeting[s] that people are given information. Poor participation hinders her ability to perform optimally.

Finally, to date, neither the gender-quota literature nor the decentralization literature has directly empirically addressed the relationship between gender quotas at the subnational level and the influence of traditional leaders. To my knowledge, this study is the first to do so.

**WHY SHOULD QUOTAS MATTER?**

How might a quota policy requiring only female candidates in local EDs affect the public authority of the chieftaincy? The literatures outlined above suggest several possibilities:

A first explanation relates to the nature of the quota law itself. A quota policy that constrains local elections to only female candidates makes the state’s presence in local politics much more visible than in the absence of such a policy. A constrained subset of potential candidates not only limits chiefs’ ability to mobilize support around a particular desired (male) candidate before the election, but the quota may also reveal to citizens the general inability of chiefs to control local elections. Thus the state’s role in visibly and dramatically shaping local elections may decrease the perceived influence of traditional leaders in reserved EDs.

A second set of explanations considers that the power-sharing dynamics between chiefs and councilors may be gendered. This is possible in both directions. Given that the chieftaincy is predominately male, male councilors and traditional leaders may be more likely to work together to uphold the patriarchal power structures of local governance. This is likely not an overt decision, but chiefs may be more comfortable working with male councilors than what they consider the more unseemly act of working with a female leader. In this scenario, chiefs are more likely to work with newly elected male councilors, and they may also decide to support particular male candidates prior to the election.

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5 It is important to note that chiefs are not barred from running in local elections, but in practice this does not happen. There has been no recorded instance of this occurrence by Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission and Basotho citizens largely consider these two domains of public authority (chiefs versus councilors) as separate. As one citizen told me, “Chiefs are chiefs and councilors are councilors. Why should a chief try to be a councilor?”
The preference of chiefs to work with male councilors rather than female councilors is made more likely by the fact that one of the central duties traditionally assigned to chiefs and recently devolved to councilors is the allocation of livestock grazing rights, particularly of cattle. Because herding is a duty undertaken by men in Sesotho society, chiefs may be more willing to work with other men in this realm of rural life rather than what they perceive as the more unnatural alliance of working with women on issues of cattle grazing. On this, Morna and Tolmay (2007, p. 117) report the following observations from their focus groups:

One of the most contentious issues is that chiefs no longer have jurisdiction over the distribution of land. Because the transfer of powers from chiefs to local government is so recent, the impact of a traditional system that theoretically has little power, but in practice exercises tremendous sway, is a contentious issue, especially for women councilors. A male councilor explained that for a long time the grazing lands have been controlled by the chiefs and the men. In the women-only constituencies, when women try to control these lands, the men challenge them.

When Basotho citizens see a female councilor involved in the allocation of grazing land, it may undermine the traditional notion that this is a male domain, which may indirectly call into question the patriarchal power structures on which chiefs base their authority. On the other hand, when male community leaders make these decisions, it does not upend the traditional patrilineal authority of chiefs in the same way. These observations suggest that the influence of traditional authorities (both real and perceived) will remain high when chiefs have the same constituencies as male councilors, but may weaken in EDs reserved for women.\(^6\)

A countering argument, however, is also plausible. Given women’s historically weak position in Sesotho society, female councilors might be more likely (or perceived to be more likely) to hand governing authority over to traditional leaders. In this instance, chiefs might back female leaders prior to the elections, as they know women will be less of a threat to their monopoly on public authority. Although there have been no recorded instances of women handing over their positions to men in reserved districts wholesale (Morna & Tolmay, 2007, p. 80), after elections chiefs may have an easier time assuming some of the responsibilities of female councilors and maintaining governing influence in their communities. Anecdotal evidence from Morna and Tolmay (2007, p. 115) also suggests that this might be occurring in some districts:

A participant in the Lesotho civil society focus group added: “Women are trapped in a cultural boundary. They are not supported by the chiefs or the community who believe that they are not good decisionmakers; that they can’t drive development. They accept whatever the elders say.”

Under this scenario, chiefs are more likely to maintain *de facto* authority under female leadership, as women become relegated to the status of tokens. If the last explanation is at play, the presence of the quota should not affect the perceived local authority of traditional leaders (or might even increase it). The first two explanations in this section rely on slightly different mediators—the first emphasizes the restrictive nature of the quota policy itself and the second emphasizes the effect of female leadership. However, under both of these explanations, I expect to find decreased levels of perceived traditional influence in reserved EDs. Although a complete testing of mediators is beyond the scope of this article, the Results section presents preliminary evidence in an attempt to adjudicate between the explanatory

\(^6\) See Ferguson (1990) for the classic anthropological study on the role cattle grazing has in Sesotho society and how it is deeply related to conflicts between men and women in rural life.
power of these potential causal explanations. To do this, I measure localized levels of chiefs’ authority prior to the quota. I expect that in areas where chiefs previously had high levels of public authority, citizens will be more likely to perceive this group as losing influence when they see a woman stepping into the policymaking domain—providing evidence for a female-leadership effect. However, in areas where chiefs were less active in communal governance prior to the quota, this explanation makes less sense. Further, the hypothesis that considers the state’s presence as delegitimating chiefs’ authority is most plausible in areas with an inactive or moribund chieftaincy. In contrast, this explanation is less plausible in areas where the chiefs’ authority is deeply embedded in local governance structures.

MEASURES AND METHODS

Random-Assignment Checks

The experimental nature of the quota design depends on the random assignment of the reserved EDs. First, it is important to note that Lesotho is a small landlocked mountainous country that is ethno-linguistically, culturally, and religiously homogenous. 99.7 percent of the population self-identifies as belonging to the Basotho ethnic group and speaks Sesotho as a first language, and 96.7 percent of the population claims to be Christian (Afro-barometer, 2008). The clustering of religious and ethnic groups are not plausible confounders of the quota’s random assignment, but other potential ED-level characteristics are. To gain leverage of the validity of random assignment, I test for observable differences across future reserved and unreserved EDs before the quota’s implementation.

Table 1 shows data from the 2003 Lesotho Afro-barometer survey, two years before the realization of the quota policy. It lists potential confounding variables, their mean values in the future reserved and unreserved EDs, the difference between the groups, and the standard error associated with this estimate. Column 5 shows the \( p \)-values associated with difference of means \( t \)-tests and column 6 reports the coefficients of future-reserved-ED residence with each cofounder as a separate dependent variable. The models are hierarchical with random intercepts allowed at the community council level. Variables that achieve traditional statistical significance (\( p \leq 0.05 \)) are indicated in bold.

The only observable potential confounder with a statistically significant difference between the future reserved and unreserved EDs is the respondents’ mean age. Respondents in future reserved EDs are on average 4.6 years older than respondents in future unreserved EDs. Given that there is balance between reserved and unreserved EDs across the other eight indicators, it is likely that this small difference in means is due to sampling variability. For increased transparency and ease of interpretation in the tests that follow, I calculate average treatment effects (ATEs) on the unmatched sample; however, the results I present below hold when running these tests on a subsample that matches control and treatment groups on respondents’ age.

Data and Dependent Variable Specification

To measure the impact of living in a reserved ED, I rely on Afro-barometer survey data, which includes a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of approximately 1,200 Basotho. I use the 2008 Afro-barometer survey to measure the impact of living in a reserved ED three years after the quota policy adoption in 2005. This research specifically employs the local-level Afro-barometer data, which identifies the village of each respondent. Respondents are located in
Table 1. Random-assignment check: Checks for random assignment from 2003 Lesotho Afro-barometer data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean future unreserved</th>
<th>Mean future reserved</th>
<th>Difference (SE)</th>
<th>t-Test p-value</th>
<th>Reservation effect with council random effects (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage rural</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.007 (0.030)</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>1.987 (1.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.861</td>
<td>1.947</td>
<td>-0.086 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.041 (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty level</td>
<td>2.928</td>
<td>2.870</td>
<td>0.058 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.006 (0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>2.210</td>
<td>2.171</td>
<td>0.040 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.080 (0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>2.640</td>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>0.075 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.045 (0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.101</td>
<td>45.691</td>
<td>-4.590 (1.351)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>3.434 (1.682)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in women’s equal rights</td>
<td>2.396</td>
<td>2.467</td>
<td>0.069 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>1.093 (1.427)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in traditional leaders</td>
<td>2.650</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>0.069 (0.081)</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.018 (0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with traditional leaders</td>
<td>2.445</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>0.044 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.063 (0.115)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Differences with significance of $p \leq 0.05$ indicated in bold. $n = 243$ for the future reserved EDs and $n = 542$ for the future unreserved EDs. See Appendix Table A1 for variable coding. All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www.3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787.

577 villages as identified by Afro-barometer survey administrators. My data merge the 2008 Afro-barometer results with data collected from Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission to identify the gender of each village’s community councilor and whether the village was in a reserved ED in 2008. I list-wise delete observations for which I cannot definitively identify the councilor’s gender and ED reservation status.\(^7\)

Appendix Table A2 presents additional balance diagnostics to show that the remaining observations are not systematically different than those from the complete data set, indicating that this loss of sample size (17.5 percent) will not introduce bias into the analyses that follow.\(^8\) Further, the Results section demonstrates that the ATE of the quota is robust to a series of regression specifications, which control for pretreatment covariates that might also affect citizens’ perceptions of local traditional influence. The rate of missingness across other relevant variables is relatively minimal (between 0 to 7 percent), but I choose to use Amelia II for R to impute missing values rather than list-wise delete remaining observations.\(^9\)

\(^7\) This happens, for instance, when there are two villages with the same name in the census list, and I cannot identify which one corresponds with the respondent’s residence as identified from the Afro-barometer data. It also occurs when the village identified by Afro-barometer researchers is not included or is spelled a different way than on the official census list. This narrows my total observations from 1,200 to 990.

\(^8\) All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www.3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787.

\(^9\) See Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2012).
The dependent variable in this study takes a question from the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, which reads as follows: “How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community?” The response categories on a Likert-type scale are “none,” “a small amount,” “some,” or “a great deal.” Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to this question by response category and respondents’ ED type.

The distribution of responses here is revealing. Respondents in EDs reserved for women are 18 percent less likely (moving from 51 percent to 42 percent) than those in unreserved EDs to report that traditional leaders have a great deal of influence in their local communities. Conversely, respondents in reserved EDs are 33 percent more likely (moving from 18 percent to 24 percent) to report that traditional leaders have a small amount of influence in their communities. The difference between the “great deal” response category by ED reservation status is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and the “small amount” response category at the 0.04 level.10

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10 Calculated through Welch two-sample $t$-tests.
Table 2. Reservation ATE: Higher values equate to higher levels of perceived traditional influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean reserved</th>
<th>Mean unreserved</th>
<th>Difference [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>p-Values: two-tailed (one-tailed)</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ord. scale</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>−0.20 [−0.37, −0.03]</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived great deal of</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>−0.09 [−0.17, −0.02]</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Differences with significance of p ≤ 0.05 indicated in bold.

RESULTS

The Reservation Effect

Table 2 shows the mean perceived traditional influence on the four-point scale for the reserved and unreserved groups (with higher values associated with greater levels of perceived traditional influence). The difference between these groups can be interpreted as the ATE—in this case 0.2 on the four-point scale. I simulate and calculate the associated 95 percent confidence intervals around this estimate based on the principles of cluster random assignment (Gerber & Green, 2012, p. 80) with respondents clustered within EDs. Using this method, I find that the ATE is bracketed by a confidence interval of a true effect size ranging from −0.37 to −0.03. To measure the standardized effect size, I divide the ATE by the standard deviation of the control (unreserved) group to reveal that the quota caused a decrease of 0.2 standard deviations on the scale of perceived traditional influence.11

The second row of Table 2 shows the ATE calculated on a dichotomous response variable in which the highest category, “a great deal of influence,” is coded as one and all other values are coded as zero. The ATE here, which also achieves traditional statistical significance, is easier to interpret. Confirming the descriptive statistics in Figure 1, exposure to a quota-mandated leader causes a nine percentage points drop (associated with an 18 percent decrease) in the number of respondents who feel their traditional leaders have a great deal of influence in local governance.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The analysis above does not reveal whether the reservation effect is due to the restrictive selection mechanisms mandated by the quota policy, or whether it is a result of chiefs having to work with a female councilor when they would have preferred a male councilor. Although the cumulative reservation effect allows for causal inference because of the random nature of the quota assignment, comparisons between residents in reserved EDs and the two respective control subgroups (male-led unreserved and female-led unreserved EDs) are problematic because these groups are neither randomly assigned nor observationally identical.

11 Researchers typically characterize standardized effects of less than 0.3 standard deviations as small, between 0.3 and 0.8 as moderate, and above 0.8 as large (Gerber & Green, 2012, p. 70).
In this section, I offer a way to gain leverage on the power of each of these respective mediators by measuring heterogeneous treatment effects among subsets of respondents living in areas with respectively active and inactive chiefs prior to the quota. I do this based on the following logic: I expect that chiefs in reserved EDs that had high levels of public authority prior to the quota lost their ability to mobilize votes around a preferred (male) candidate to a greater degree than in areas where they had low levels of preexisting authority. Further areas with influential chiefs are more likely to house citizens with heightened beliefs about the importance of patriarchal power structures. In these areas, the experience of having a quota-mandated female community leader (especially dealing in the domain of grazing rights) may be seen as more shocking, causing citizens to reevaluate the chiefs’ role in local governance to a greater degree than in areas where the local chief had less of a presence in the community prior to the quota. Therefore, if the female leadership mediator is at play, I expect the quota’s ATE to be highly pronounced among the subset of respondents living in active chieftaincies.

I have also hypothesized that the quota law may have delegitimized the chiefs’ authority when the strict stipulations of the policy revealed to citizens the ability of the state to control local elections in a way that superseded the chiefs’ prerogative. The ability of the state to so quickly delegitimize the entrenched authority of local chiefs, however, seems most plausible in areas with an already inactive or moribund chieftaincy. Therefore, if this mediator is at play, I expect the quota’s ATE to be especially pronounced among citizens in areas where the chief was not previously highly involved in communal governance.

One question from the 2003 Afro-barometer survey round, two years prior to the quota’s adoption, asked respondents how often they contacted a traditional ruler during the previous year “for help to solve a problem or to give them your views.” Respondents could indicate on a four-point Likert-type scale that they had never contacted a traditional ruler, had done so only once, had done so a few times, or had done so often during the previous year. This observed variation in traditional leaders’ presence in their communities prior to quota adoption, as measured by contact with their subjects, provides a useful way to test for conditional reservation effects in communities with respectively high and low preexisting levels of traditional influence. Importantly, responses to this 2003 survey question are not correlated with the assignment of the quota policy (see Table 1) and the measure therefore allows for the separation of subgroups within both the future reserved and unreserved EDs with arguably high or low levels of preexisting traditional influence.

To create a subset of EDs (both reserved and unreserved) with high preexisting levels of traditional influence, I select only council areas from the 2003 survey with a modal response indicating residents had contacted a traditional leader often during the previous year. I then select residents in these same council areas from the 2008 data to create a group of respondents who lived in an area with an oft-contacted chief prior to the instigation of the quota policy. Conversely, to create a subset of observations with low levels of preexisting traditional influence, I select a subset of EDs (again both reserved and unreserved) from the 2003 data with the modal response of never having contacted a traditional leader in the previous year. I include respondents with residence in these council areas from the 2008 data to

12 Empirically this is the case. Areas with oft-contacted chiefs prior to the quota were significantly less likely to elect female leaders on their own volition than areas with seldom-contacted chiefs.

13 Unfortunately, specifying to the level of ED is not possible from the 2003 to the 2008 data, as Afro-barometer staff did not sample enough of the same villages to disaggregate at this level. I therefore select respondents who are in the same council area. However, given that chiefs’ wards do not directly correspond with EDs it is likely that chiefs’ influence is spatially clustered to include surrounding villages.
Table 3. Model-based estimates of conditional ATEs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Coef [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>Model 2: Coef [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>Model 3: Coef [95 percent CI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>−0.20 [−0.37, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.20 [−0.38, −0.02]</td>
<td>0.20 [−0.41, 0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 2003 contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.09 [−0.36, 0.19]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High contact × Quota</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.07 [−0.41, 0.54]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low 2003 contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.08 [−0.26, 0.11]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low contact × Quota</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02 [−0.32, 0.36]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>3003.11</td>
<td>3010.23</td>
<td>3011.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3022.70</td>
<td>3039.61</td>
<td>3040.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−1497.55</td>
<td>−1499.11</td>
<td>−1499.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>2995.11</td>
<td>2998.23</td>
<td>2999.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups (EDs)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: ED</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: residual</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Differences with significance of $p \leq 0.05$ indicated in bold.

create a subset of respondents living in areas with seldom-contacted chiefs prior to the quota.

I use a series of regressions with treatment by covariate interactions to model potential treatment effect heterogeneity within subgroups with respectively high and low levels of preexisting traditional contact. To account for the nested structure of individuals within EDs, I use an OLS specification of hierarchical linear modeling with random intercepts at the ED level. Model 1 of Table 3 first shows the calculation of the quota’s ATE under this specification, which is identical to the estimate calculated through randomization inference presented above. Model 2 and model 3 show the conditional ATEs (CATEs) within the subgroups for areas with respectively high and low levels of reported citizen contact with chiefs prior to the quota policy.

There do not appear to be heterogeneous treatment effects in areas with either high or low preexisting levels of chiefly contact, as neither interaction term is statistically significant.\footnote{This null finding is robust across a series of grouping specifications from the 2003 contact variable.} Further the $p$-values associated with the corresponding $F$-tests comparing model 1 to model 2 and model 3 are, respectively, 0.64 and 0.96, indicating the presence of an interaction term does not identify significant CATEs for these particular subgroups. The lack of heterogeneous treatment effects within these respective subgroups suggests that, as is often the case in social science research, more than one mediator is likely causing the quota policy to change the way citizens view the influence of their local traditional leaders. I address the implication of this further in the Discussion section.

### Robustness Considerations

Although the quota was randomly assigned, as a robustness consideration I also use a series of regression models to test whether the ATE holds when controlling for
### Table 4. Model-based robustness considerations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Coef [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>Model 2: Coef [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>Model 3: Coef [95 percent CI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>3.07 [2.98, 3.16]</td>
<td>2.76 [2.60, 2.92]</td>
<td>3.33 [2.54, 4.14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>−0.20 [−0.37, −0.03]</td>
<td>−0.14 [−0.30, −0.02]</td>
<td>−0.13 [−0.29, 0.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.38 [0.21, 0.55]</td>
<td>0.40 [0.23, 0.58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 [−0.01, 0.00]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.05 [−0.18, 0.09]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.04 [−0.15, 0.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.13 [−0.29, 0.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.03 [−0.21, 0.14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>3003.11</td>
<td>2990.46</td>
<td>3013.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3022.70</td>
<td>3014.95</td>
<td>3062.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−1497.55</td>
<td>−1490.23</td>
<td>−1496.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>2995.11</td>
<td>2980.46</td>
<td>2993.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups (EDs)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: ED (intercept)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: residual</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Differences with significance of $p \leq 0.05$ indicated in bold. See Appendix Table A1 for variable coding. All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www.3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787.

additional pretreatment covariates that might also affect the way citizens perceive the influence of their local traditional leader. I control for respondents’ age, sex, education, poverty level, religiosity, and urban/rural residence. The results from model 2 indicate that, unsurprisingly, chiefs are perceived to have more influence (and by all accounts indeed have more influence) in rural communities compared to urban communities. Including this variable as a covariate somewhat attenuates the quota’s ATE, but the ATE maintains its statistical significance at the 0.08 level. Further, the results of model 3 show that including other demographic covariates does not significantly reduce the quota’s effect nor improve model fit—and the quota’s ATE again maintains its significance at the 0.08 level.

An additional robustness check accounts for the potential nonrandom missingness of the observations I list-wise delete because I cannot definitely identify their village reservation status. Here I conduct an extreme bounds analysis, first grouping these approximately 200 observations in the control group and then in the treatment group. My findings remain relatively robust to these considerations as well. Grouping all missing observations in the control (unreserved) group results in an ATE with a $p$-value of 0.01. Conversely, grouping these observations in the treatment (reserved) group results in an ATE with a $p$-value of 0.07. Finally, a series of regression models (not presented) with covariate by treatment interactions reveal that there are no statistically significant heterogeneous treatment effects among the various demographic subgroups I control for in Table 4.
Alternative Explanations

One alternative explanation suggests that citizens perceive chiefs as losing influence in reserved EDs because female community councilors in reserved EDs bring greater welfare benefits to their communities compared to councilors in unreserved EDs. Under this scenario, citizens that see their councilors delivering more public goods will be more likely to view preexisting traditional leaders as ineffective as compared to citizens in areas that do not experience competent councilors. However, Tang (2014) examines the welfare implications of Lesotho’s quota policy and finds evidence that is inconsistent with this theory. Using budget data from the local councils during the quota’s six-year duration, she finds that female councilors in reserved EDs are less likely to successfully solicit infrastructure projects from the central government as compared to male and female councilors in unreserved EDs. Taken together with the findings presented here, this suggests that citizens in reserved EDs perceive their chiefs as losing authority despite the fact that female councilors in these areas are not performing as well as councilors in unreserved EDs. This further suggests that the quota’s ATE is mediated through the policy’s effect on the gendered dynamics between chiefs and councilors rather than their relative competence in providing local public goods.\(^\text{15}\)

A second alternative explanation relates to voting patterns and elections results. If citizens were more or less likely to vote across district types in the 2005 local elections, this might affect how these citizens’ will go on to view the successful candidates’ authority. If, for instance, voter turnout was higher in reserved EDs because the unique nature of the quota law drew more attention to these elections, then citizens might view successful quota-mandated candidates as having more authority than in areas where turnout was low. The 2005 election data, however, reveals that this is unlikely. The election results recorded by Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission contain information on how many votes the winning candidate received (but not the margin of victory). This measure is distributed evenly across leadership type. Winning male councilors received an average of 160 votes and winning female councilors received an average 162 votes in unreserved EDs and 159 votes in reserved EDs, suggesting that voter turnout was similar across ED type.

DISCUSSION

Evaluating Mediators

In sum, I find that the influence of traditional authorities is significantly diminished in EDs reserved for only female candidates, and that this effect is equally pronounced in EDs in which the chieftaincy had both a strong and weak presence prior to the quota’s adoption. Although a complete testing of mediators is beyond the scope of this study, a review of the hypotheses outlined in the section on Quotas is useful.

First, I have not found evidence that chiefs benefit from quota-mandated female leadership because women present less of a threat to their monopoly on local authority. To the contrary, citizens perceive chiefs as losing authority under this scenario. An additional hypothesis presented earlier suggested that the restrictive nature of the quota policy might have a delegitimizing effect on chiefs’ authority. Under this account, I expected that citizens in areas with an inactive or moribund chieftaincy

\(^{15}\) Of course, one potential reason female councilors in reserved EDs are less able to successfully attract funding projects is because they are stymied by local chiefs, as my qualitative data would suggest.

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Table 5. Reservation ATE on opinions about traditional influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should traditional influence increase?</th>
<th>Mean reserved</th>
<th>Mean unreserved</th>
<th>Difference [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>p-Values: two-tailed</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should traditional influence increase?</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>0.03 [−0.12, 0.18]</td>
<td>0.69 (0.32)</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Differences with significance of \( p \leq 0.05 \) indicated in bold. Higher values equate to stronger levels of agreement that traditional influence should increase.

would be more likely to accept the new role of the state and, hence, the governing influence of female councilors. A second explanation posited that chiefs prefer to share governing responsibilities (when they must) with other men and that chiefs’ relationships with female councilors are more likely to be defined by conflict. Under this scenario, I expected that the reservation effect would be the most pronounced in areas with an influential chief prior to the quota because it is in these areas in which chiefs should have gotten their preferred candidates in unreserved EDs and felt the limitations of the quota most severely in reserved EDs.

I find no statistically significant heterogeneous treatment effects among citizens in areas with respectively oft- or seldom-contacted chiefs prior to the quota. This suggests, although certainly far from proves, that both of these mediators may be at play. Future studies might use experimental approaches to test the implications of these potential mediators more fully.

Public Sentiment toward Traditional Leaders

One additional policy-relevant question from the 2008 Afro-barometer asks respondents their opinions on the influence of traditional leaders in their communities. The question reads: “Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?” Respondents could indicate on a five-point scale that the influence of traditional leaders should “decrease a lot,” “decrease somewhat,” “stay the same,” “increase somewhat,” or “increase a lot.” Table 5 reveals that there is not a statistically significant difference between citizens’ responses to this question in reserved and unreserved EDs, despite the perceptions that traditional leaders have lost influence in the former. This seems to indicate that even though citizens believe that chiefs are losing influence in EDs reserved for female leaders, they accept the changing nature of local governance.

Perceived versus Real Influence

Ideally this study would have examined whether the quota affected the real—rather than perceived— influence of traditional leaders in governing their local communities. The ability to empirically measure and collect reliable data on the ways in which traditional patrons influence local governance in new democracies, however, proves difficult, and recently has led researchers to develop clever identification strategies, including experimental approaches, to empirically document this phenomenon (see, e.g., Baldwin [2013] & Wantchekon [2003]).

This study, in contrast, examines the way citizens perceive the influence of local chiefs, which is an important contribution to our understanding of the changing roles of traditional leaders in decentralized contexts for at least two reasons. First,
it is quite possible that Basotho citizens are apt perceivers of the actual influence of chiefs in their communities. As noted, over 99 percent of Basotho report having a local traditional leader. This means that when respondents were asked, “How much influence do traditional leaders have in governing your local community,” they could respond factually, rather than hypothetically.

Second, even if perceived influence is not a proxy for real influence, perceptions of the public authority of traditional leaders in new democracies have important implications for the democratic legitimacy of recently decentralized institutions. If, as some scholars have argued, the chieftaincy constitutes an inherently nondemocratic or antidemocratic form of governance (Mamdani, 1996) that consistently excludes the voices of youth and women (Beall, 2005; Molutsi, 2004), then we might imagine that decreased perceptions of the chiefs’ authority may increase the democratic legitimacy of recently decentralized governance structures. However, if the popular perceptions of the chieftaincy and new local authorities are positively linked (Logan, 2009), then a decrease in the former has less obvious implications on the public commitment to local democracy. This article does not attempt to adjudicate between these competing expectations regarding how the loss of perceived traditional influence translates into support for local democratic institutions; however, it adds to this literature by examining the antecedents of changing popular perceptions of traditional authority.

CONCLUSION

The popularity of electoral gender quotas as a way of integrating more women into formal political power structures has increased dramatically in the last two to three decades, at both the national and subnational levels, in every region of the world. For instance, countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Albania, Mexico, and South Sudan have all adopted subnational electoral gender quotas in the last 10 years. In tandem, scholarly work aimed at understanding the varied potential impacts of quotas has also expanded rapidly. My findings contribute to a growing dimension of this research agenda: the extent to which quota policies have allowed women to turn their new de jure political positions into de facto political authority.

My contribution here examines how quota-mandated female leadership affects the way citizens perceive the influence of local traditional elites. The case of Lesotho, by many accounts, is similar to most rural communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, in which hereditary chiefs selected along patrilineal lines continue to be the main source of local public authority. Although a great deal of work remains to be done on this question, Lesotho’s policy experiment provides distinctly causal evidence that, rather than being relegated to the status of tokens, citizens see quota-mandated female leaders as filling governing spaces that were traditionally assumed by the predominately male chieftaincy—and that this is true in both previously active and inactive chieftaincies. Further, citizens in these districts do not appear to lament this loss of traditional authority, which indicates a certain level of acceptance of the women who have assumed political authority via quotas.

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REFERENCES


### Table A1. Variable coding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community? | 1 = None  
2 = A small amount  
3 = Some  
4 = A great deal |
| Treatment                                                                           |        |
| Quota-mandated female leadership                                                   | Respondent lives in an electoral division (ED) that was reserved for only female candidates in the 2005 election (0/1) |
| Additional variables used in assessing random assignment and conditional average treatment effects |        |
| How interested would you say you are in public affairs? You know, in politics and government. | 1 = Not at all interested  
2 = Not very interested  
3 = Somewhat interested  
4 = Very interested |
| When you get together with your friends or family would you say you discuss political matters? | 1 = Never  
2 = Occasionally  
3 = Frequently |
| Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without enough food to eat? (Poverty) | 1 = Never  
2 = Just once or twice  
3 = Several times  
4 = Many times  
5 = Always |
| What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Education Level)        | 1 = No schooling  
2 = Primary  
3 = Secondary  
4 = Post Secondary |
| Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or statement B. | 1 = Agree Very Strongly with B  
2 = Agree with B  
3 = Agree with A  
4 = Agree Very Strongly with A |
| Age                                                                                 | Respondent’s age in years |
| How important is religion in your life? (Religiosity)                               | 1 = Not at all important  
2 = Not very important  
3 = Somewhat important  
4 = Very important |
| How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Traditional Leaders/ Chiefs/ Elders? | 1 = Not at all  
2 = A little bit  
3 = A lot  
4 = A very great deal |
| During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A traditional ruler? | 1 = Never  
2 = Only once  
3 = A few times  
4 = Often |
Table A2. Checks for random assignment from 2003 Lesotho Afro-barometer data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean future complete data</th>
<th>Mean future sample data</th>
<th>Difference (SE)</th>
<th>$t$-Test $p$-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent rural</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.032 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.920</td>
<td>1.907</td>
<td>0.013 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty level</td>
<td>2.593</td>
<td>2.593</td>
<td>0.000 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>2.235</td>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>0.005 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>3.034</td>
<td>3.048</td>
<td>$-0.014$ (0.052)</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.508</td>
<td>41.363</td>
<td>0.144 (0.787)</td>
<td>0.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived traditional influence</td>
<td>3.023</td>
<td>3.017</td>
<td>0.006 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>3.913</td>
<td>3.914</td>
<td>$-0.001$ (0.016)</td>
<td>0.961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Differences with significance of $p \leq 0.05$ indicated in bold. $n = 1,200$ for complete data set and $n = 990$ for data used in the included analysis. See Appendix Table A1 for variable coding. All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at [http://www.3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787](http://www.3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787).